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Article 2

ARTICLES

Reviving Proxy Marriage
Andrea B. Carroll†
Ask people to identify the most important event in their lives
and their answers bear an overwhelming resemblance. The day of
their marriage ranks near the top of the list for virtually all.1 Entry
into the marital relationship is a decision we approach with much
contemplation and reflection.2 Typically, the decision is not made
whimsically. Indeed, popular culture has admonished us that “only
fools rush in,” a virtual axiom in today’s society.3 Nonetheless,
American states recognize without exception that marriage is merely
a contract.4 It creates myriad rights and responsibilities5—essentially
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1
See Andrew Sullivan, Why the M Word Matters to Me, TIME (Feb. 8, 2004),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1101040216-588877,00.html.
2
See Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract,
84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1254-55 (1998).
3
ELVIS PRESLEY, Fools Rush In, on ELVIS NOW (RCA Records 1971); DECADE
BY DECADE 1940S: TEN YEARS OF POPULAR HITS ARRANGED FOR EASY PIANO 49 (crediting
songwriter Johnny Mercer as the author of the song popularized by Elvis Presley). For
use of the phrase dating back to the early twentieth century, see also Alexander Pope, An
Essay on Criticism, in THE RAPE OF THE LOCK AND OTHER POEMS OF ALEXANDER POPE 70,
90 (Macmillan Co. 1921) (“For fools rush in where Angels fear to tread.”).
4
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 4 (2009). See generally E. SCHILLEBEECKX,
MARRIAGE: HUMAN REALITY AND SAVING MYSTERY 388 (1965) (contractual basis of
marriage came from the Roman consensus idea of marriage adopted by the Roman
Catholic Church).
5
55 C.J.S. Marriage § 1 (2009); see also Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and
Quasi Rents; Or, I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 272
(1987) (“Even seemingly vague and poetic marriage vows imply, yet conceal, a set of
rights and obligations that are generally understood by the parties.”).
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conferring a status6—but the parties’ relationship is, at base, nothing
more than a contractual one.
Still, modern society has elevated the marriage contract above
all others. This distinction has focused overwhelmingly on the very
personal nature of the marital relationship, a feature nonexistent in
the arms-length contractual dealings with which we are accustomed
to working when applying contract law.7 As a result, marriage is
subject to a number of requirements, even at the level of contractual
formation, that are unknown to the general law of contract.8 With the
exception of the thirteen American jurisdictions allowing common law
marriage,9 spouses must participate in person in a formal marriage
ceremony at which they express their free consent and affirm their
intent to undertake the marital relationship, with all the rights and
duties it entails.10 To solidify the union, a solemn ceremony is
typically required: a qualified officiant must preside11 and witnesses
must be present.12 No other contract is subjected to as high an entry

6

55 C.J.S. Marriage § 2 (2009) (“Marriage is generally considered a civil
contract differing in notable respects from ordinary contracts, but it is also and
specially a status or personal relation in which the state is deeply concerned and over
which the state exercises exclusive dominion.”).
7
Id.; 1 JOEL PRENTISS BISHOP, MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE § 3 (6th ed. 1881)
(“While the contract remains a mere agreement to marry, it is not essentially different
from other executory contracts. . . . But when it is executed in what the law accepts as
a valid marriage, its nature as a contract is merged in the higher nature of the
status.”); see also Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 1248. See generally Maynard v. Hill,
125 U.S. 190 (1888).
8
See Scott & Scott, supra note 2, at 1289; see also Bishop v. Britain Inv. Co.,
129 S.W. 668, 676 (Mo. 1910) (“[W]hile we speak of marriage as a civil contract, yet that is
a narrow view of it. The consensus of opinion in civilized nations is that marriage is
something more than a dry contract. It is a contract different from all others.”).
9
A common law marriage is a marriage between two people who did not
obtain a marriage license nor solemnize their union by formal ceremony. Although
state laws vary, it generally requires the mutual consent of the parties to the marriage,
cohabitation, and a public declaration that the parties are husband and wife. E.g.,
Hurley v. Hurley, 721 P.2d 1279, 1284 (Mont. 1986). Common law marriage is
permitted in Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, New Hampshire,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, and the District of Columbia.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-109.5 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1.1 (West 2003);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-403 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 (2010); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 20-1-360 (1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 30-1-4.5 (LexisNexis 2007); Hoage v. Murch Bros. Constr. Co., 50 F.2d 983, 985-86
(D.C. Cir. 1931); Wall v. Williams, 11 Ala. 826 (1847); Gammelgaard v. Gammelgaard,
77 N.W.2d 479 (Iowa 1956); Smith v. Smith, 165 P.2d 593 (Kan. 1946).
10
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICTS OF LAW § 283 (1971).
11
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2008) (“A marriage ceremony may be
performed by (1) A priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or
any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the authorities of his religion
to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or
justice of the peace.”).
12
State law varies on the number of witnesses required to perfect a
ceremonial marriage. For example, Arizona requires two witnesses, while Connecticut
does not require any witnesses so long as the officiant is qualified or the parties
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requirement.13 Moreover, the application of one of the most
fundamental doctrines of contract law—namely, that a contracting
party need not formally enter into the contractual relationship
himself but may instead designate an agent to act on his behalf14—is
generally viewed as inapplicable to the marital relationship.15 Socalled proxy marriages, then—in which one party authorizes an agent
to stand in his stead at the marriage ceremony—are widely disdained
in the United States.16
Agency theory, we say, is simply not well suited to application
in the marital context.17 Thus, a proxy marriage is not a valid
marriage at all in most states.18 Only five American states have
recognized otherwise, and nearly all in an exceptionally narrow
context involving military personnel.19 So serious is the contempt for
proxy marriage that the doctrine has been rejected throughout most
of this country for almost seventy years.20 But things have changed,
and it is time to reevaluate the efficacy and equity of distinguishing
between marriage and all other contractual relationships to which
agency theory applies.
Society has evolved in a much more mobile direction.21 Its
members more often find themselves separated by great distances, by
different means, and for different reasons than they did in the past.22
Thousands of couples desiring to marry are unable to fulfill
ceremonial marriage requirements because active military service
reasonably believe him to be. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-125 (2007); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46b-24 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
13
But see Comments, 15 TUL. L. REV. 436, 436 (1941) (describing elaborate
ceremonial procedures for transferring title to real property in medieval times; such
form requirements no longer exist today).
14
1 FLOYD RUSSELL MECHEM, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF AGENCY § 80 (2d
ed. 1914).
15
Id. §§ 124, 126.
16
Emily Post, The Day of the Wedding, in ETIQUETTE: THE BLUE BOOK OF
SOCIAL USAGE ch. 26 (1937); see also Marvin M. Moore, The Case for Proxy Marriage,
11 CLEV.-MARSHALL L. REV. 313, 313 (1962).
17
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126.
18
See id. §§ 124, 126; see also 52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (2009) (“Under the
law of some states, parties cannot be married by proxy. In such states the personal presence
of both the bride and the groom at the marriage rites is essential to the proper
solemnization of the marriage, and a marriage by proxy is invalid as a ceremonial
marriage.”).
19
CAL. FAM. CODE § 420 (West. Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2109 (West 2005); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.006
(West 2006); 80 Op. Att’y Gen. 261, 1980 WL 117668 (Kan. A.G.) (1980).
20
NANCY F. COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION
154 (2000).
21
See DAVID J. ELAZAR, BUILDING CITIES IN AMERICA: URBANIZATION AND
SUBURBANIZATION IN A FRONTIER SOCIETY 16 (1987) (describing the “nomadism” of the
American people as one of the hallmarks of American life); Richard Briffault, Our
Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 413 (1990).
22
See John S. Broadway, Legalizing Proxy Marriages, 21 U. KAN. CITY L.
REV. 111, 112-14 (1952). See generally Briffault, supra note 21.
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makes travel impossible.23 Far more often these days, other
employment commitments require one party to live away from home,
making personal participation in a marriage ceremony impossible or
impracticable.24 For example, in what was perhaps the highest profile
proxy marriage attempted in the United States, a Russian cosmonaut
working while orbiting Earth aboard the International Space Station
in 2003 married his Texan bride by proxy through the use of an agent
standing in for him at NASA.25 Same-sex partners around the
country, who may now legally marry in six American jurisdictions,26
might avoid the cost and other significant burdens of traveling to a
state permitting same-sex marriage by appointing proxies and
remaining in their home state.27 In each of these situations, denying
parties who strongly wish to take on the contractual obligations of
marriage deprives them—and, worse still, their children—of the
many personal and property rights afforded to married persons.28
Perhaps more importantly, the law has evolved as well.
Agency theories, once relegated almost exclusively to commercial
transactions,29 now apply to scores of personal dealings. As a result of
legal developments in the last thirty years, one can, among other
23

Broadway, supra note 22, at 114; Moore, supra note 16, at 313.
See Briffault, supra note 21, at 413. See, e.g., Government Jobs Overview,
FED. JOBS NETWORK, http://federaljobs.net.overview.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2010)
(“Many federal workers’ duties require travel away from their duty station to attend
meetings, complete training, or perform inspections while others—such as auditors,
instructors, field engineering crews, and safety investigators—may require extensive
travel for weeks or months at a time. Some employees are on continuous travel . . . .”).
25
James Oberg, Cosmonaut in World’s First Space Wedding, MSNBC.COM (Aug.
12, 2003), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3077947. Internationally, many of history’s most
famous couples were married by proxy. Napoleon married Maria Louisa by proxy in 1810
with an archduke performing his role. 2 JOHN S.C. ABBOTT, THE HISTORY OF NAPOLEON
BONAPARTE 172 (1855). Marie Antoinette and King Louis XVI were also married by proxy.
JEANNE-LOUISE HENRIETTE CAMPAN, MEMOIRS OF MARIE ANTOINETTE 38-39 (1910).
26
Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Vermont, and the
District of Columbia allow marriages between same-sex partners. N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 457-A:1 (2010); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1201-07 (2007); D.C. CODE § 32-701(3)
(2009); Kerrigan v. Comm’r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008); Varnum v.
Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009); Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941
(Mass. 2003). In addition, the tribal law of the Coquille Indian Tribe in Oregon permits
same-sex marriage. COQUILLE INDIAN TRIBAL CODE § 740.010(2) (2008).
27
See Kevin Lavery, Online Gay Marriage Seen as Game-Changer, NPR.ORG
(Dec. 14, 2009), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=121283017
(describing the serious economic boon that might be fostered if states allowing gay
marriage allowed parties to seek marriage licenses online); see also Adam Candeub &
Mae Kuykendall, E-Marriage: Breaking the Marriage Monopoly (MSU Legal Studies
Research, Working Paper No. 07-25, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1491704.
28
See infra Part III.A.2.
29
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 10 (“If agency be deemed to belong to contractual
representation properly, it will at once be seen that it belongs to a condition of society in
which commercial transactions are highly developed. A non-commercial society, while it
might have much use for servants, would have little need of agents. The historical
condition seems to accord with this conclusion.”).
24
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things, appoint an agent to make end-of-life decisions,30 appoint an
agent to draft a will,31 even appoint an agent to exercise custody over
one’s child.32 In other words, agency doctrine has permeated the most
personal of our relationships, save the marital relationship.
The time has come to reassess our long-standing intolerance
of proxy marriage. To that end, Part I of this article surveys the
history of proxy marriage, from early Roman times to today, with a
view toward providing an explanation for the doctrine’s negative
perception in both the United States and abroad. Part II describes the
reluctance to sanction proxy marriage based on the theory that
agency law is not properly extended to exceptionally personal
transactions. In addition, it challenges the assumption that marriage
is too personal to be governed by agency principles given agency law’s
application to other intimate dealings. Part III details, from an
equitable standpoint, why proxy marriage is needed in today’s mobile
society and argues that existing protective mechanisms inherent in
agency law can ensure the continued integrity of proxy marriages.
Finally, Part IV argues that it is time to stop singling out the marital
contract as unworthy of an agency regime; a widespread revival of
proxy marriage is long overdue.
I.

THE VALIDITY OF PROXY MARRIAGE: THEN AND NOW

The history of proxy marriage is as long as it is sordid.
Indeed, some scholars trace the origin of proxy marriage to biblical
times.33 It was a well-accepted means of perfecting a marriage in
antiquity under both of the world’s great legal traditions—civil law
and common law; it remained possible through the Middle Ages;34 and
it likely even took hold in the American colonies.35 In fact, proxy
marriage was practiced somewhat prolifically in the United States
until just after World War I, when racial and immigration concerns
led to its virtual demise.36 Today, the possibility of a valid proxy
marriage in America is rather scant. Much of the rest of the world
holds quite a different view, however, making the legality of proxy

30

See infra Part II.C. Pennsylvania was the first state to enact a special
durable power of attorney for health care decisions in 1983. Cynthia M. Garraty,
Durable Power of Attorney for Health Care: A Better Choice, 7 CONN. PROB. L.J. 115,
119 (1992) (citing 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (Purdon Supp. 1991)). By
1992, thirty-two states had done so. Id. at 120.
31
See infra Part II.A.
32
See infra Part II.B. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:951-:954 (2008).
33
See, e.g., Luke B. Henry, California and Proxy Marriage, 27 J. ST. B. CAL.
294, 294 (1952) (“The first recorded instance of a marriage contracted by proxy is said
to have been when Rebecca offered water from the well to the servant of Abraham who
had been empowered to find a wife for Abraham’s son, Isaac.”).
34
See infra Part I.A.2.
35
See infra Part I.A.4.
36
See infra Part I.A.5.
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marriage a controversial issue over which nations regularly engage in
vigorous debate.37
A.

The Genesis and Development of the Proxy-Marriage Doctrine

The validity of a proxy marriage was recognized at some point
across almost all societies. Even those groups most expected to abhor
the doctrine—in particular, organized religious groups, such as the
Roman Catholic Church—embraced proxy marriage as necessary and
equitable.38 As a result, proxy marriage rather easily gained
acceptance in the United States.39 After its introduction, however, the
doctrine quickly became loathed and was ultimately abrogated.40
1. Roman Acceptance of Marriage by Messenger
For the ancient Romans, marriage was viewed as a contract—
a relationship “based solely upon the agreement of the parties to take
each other from that moment as husband and wife.”41 Thus, in Roman
times, the only precondition for a valid marriage was mutually
expressed consent.42 No particular ceremony or officiant was required,
and the consent of the spouses was not required to take any
particular form.43 As in all contracts, expressions of consent could be
made in writing, orally, and sometimes even tacitly.44
This perception of marriage as a mere civil contract was
taken quite seriously, so much so that Roman authorities viewed the
expression of consent (at least for a man) as possible not only in
person but also through a letter or the use of an agent, both of which
were acceptable means of consenting to ordinary contractual
relationships.45 Thus, Roman law permitted a man away from home to
37

See Egon Schwelb, Marriage and Human Rights, 12 AM. J. COMP. L. 337,
365-69 (1963).
38
See infra Part I.A.2.
39
See infra Part I.A.4.
40
See infra Part I.A.5.
41
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Marriage by Proxy and the Conflict of Laws, 32 HARV.
L. REV. 473, 474 (1919).
42
FRITZ SCHULZ, CLASSICAL ROMAN LAW 111 (1951). This has been true, at
least, since the time of Alexander the Great. See Charles Donahue, Jr., The Case of the
Man Who Fell into the Tiber: The Roman Law of Marriage at the Time of the
Glossators, 22 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 1, 11-12 (1978). In more ancient times, the consent of
the bride was altogether unnecessary, though Roman law evolved to require the
consent of both the bride and groom. A.A. Roberts, Marriage by Proxy: Including a
Brief Consideration of the Nature of Marriage and of Agency, 60 SALJ 280, 284 (1943).
Additionally, a paterfamilias’ consent to the marriage of a child under his power was
required. Susan Treggiari, Ideals and Practicalities in Matchmaking in Ancient Rome,
in THE FAMILY IN ITALY FROM ANTIQUITY TO PRESENT 94 (David I. Kertzer & Richard P.
Saller eds., 1991).
43
Treggiari, supra note 42, at 95-96.
44
Id. at 96.
45
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 474.
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perfect a marriage in his absence through the use of a messenger.46
The intended husband’s use of a proxy in this manner created a
perfectly valid marriage.47 The option to marry by proxy, however, did
not extend to an absent woman, largely due to Roman views of the
appropriate course of conduct between parties immediately after the
marriage ceremony.48 The notion was that wife needed to be led into
the domicile of the marriage such that the parties could officially
begin their married life, and in early Roman times, the marital
domicile was necessarily that of the husband.49 It was therefore
impossible for a Roman wife to use a proxy to perfect the marital
contract because she could not then be led to the marital domicile.
The Roman husband, however, was free to marry by proxy at will.50
By roughly 550 AD, the requirement that the wife be led to the home
of the husband was no longer a clear legal mandate, though it
persisted as a custom for some time.51 Thus, by the middle of the sixth
century, proxy marriage had fully taken hold as a legally permissible
manner of creating the marital relationship.52
This rather complete acceptance of proxy marriage by Roman
citizens and jurists would prove significant. The spread of Roman law
throughout nearly all of Europe53 and its role in shaping the civil law
of a number of European countries more than six centuries later54
ensured proxy marriage a continuing presence in the international
legal landscape.55
2. Canon Law’s Surprising Approval
Perhaps even more significant to the long-term survival of the
proxy-marriage doctrine than its Roman law reception is the warm
welcome it received in Roman Catholic canon law. One might assume
that marriage was always inextricably linked with religion, but the
link did not actually appear in law until approximately 541 AD. The
Corpus Juris Civilis, the Emperor Justinian’s influential compilation
of early Roman law,56 required that all but citizens holding high office
“betake themselves to some place of worship and declare their
intention” to a church official before several witnesses such that the

46

Id.
Id.
48
Roberts, supra note 42, at 284.
49
Id.
50
DIG. 23.2.5 (Pomponius, Sabinus 4); Roberts, supra note 42, at 284.
51
See sources cited supra note 50.
52
Roberts, supra note 42, at 284.
53
See PETER STEIN, ROMAN LAW IN EUROPEAN HISTORY 39-41 (1999).
54
See id. at 43-49.
55
See infra Part I.B.2.
56
Eric Gillman, Note, Legal Transplants & Investment Agreements: Understanding
the Exportation of U.S. Law to Latin America, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 263, 263 (2009).
47
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church could document the marriage.57 Canon law certainly
recognized marriage as a legal relationship—a contract.58 But in
requiring that the parties celebrate the perfection of their contract in
the church and with the blessing of a priest, canon law sought
primarily to provide the marriage publicity (i.e., to “bring the fact of
marriage to the notice of the church”).59 Ensuring that the marriage
was entirely voluntary—that the parties did truly consent to the
creation of the contract—might best be described as an afterthought,
a positive side effect of the requirement that marriages take place in
a church.60 On the background of this aim to bring couples into the
church to celebrate their marriage contracts, canon law was required
to take a legal stance on proxy marriage—in essence, to determine
whether one spouse’s failure to personally declare consent before
witnesses and a priest was sufficient to taint the entire marriage with
nullity. Rather surprisingly, the canon law view was that it was not.61
Centuries later, in 1215, proxy marriage aroused great
attention at canon law when the Roman Catholic Church, under Pope
Innocent III’s leadership, fully endorsed the Roman view of the
validity of a marriage perfected with one party using a stand-in.62 In a
development somewhat progressive for the time, however, canon law
modified the Roman rule, making it possible for either husband or
wife to marry by proxy.63 Thus, the possibility of proxy marriage
became rather well accepted—and gender-neutral—in the canon law
of the early thirteenth century.64
More than one hundred years later, under Pope Boniface VIII,
the church’s approval of proxy marriage persisted,65 though not
without some dissatisfaction. A number of church officials voiced
opposition to the continuing acceptance of proxy marriage, suggesting
that the marital contract is one “of such far reaching consequences
that [consent] should be expressed in person instead of by proxy.”66
Even in the face of this opposition, however, the church continued to
57

Roberts, supra note 42, at 285-86.
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475.
59
Id. at 476.
60
By the time of the Council of Trent in 1563, issues relating to the
voluntariness of consent to the marital relationship had gained more sway. CARRIÈRE,
DE MATRIMONIO § 4; EMIL FRIEDBERG, LEHRBUCH DES KATHOLISCHEN UND
EVANGELISCHEN KIRCHENRECHTS 490 (1895); see also Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 476
(“Since the Council of Trent (1563) matrimonial consents must be exchanged according
to the Canon Law before a priest and at least two witnesses.”).
61
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 473 (“That marriage by proxy was allowed in
the . . . Canon Law is an established fact.”).
62
2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I 370-71 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1898); see also
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475.
63
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 475.
64
Id. at 474.
65
Id. at 475.
66
Id.
58
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treat proxy marriages as valid.67 The majority view was that there is
an in-person expression of consent by a principal to a proxy
marriage.68 Agency theory views the agent as a “stand-in” for the
principal, such that when an agent expresses his assent to a contract,
the principal has essentially “pronounce[d] the words” himself
“through the [agent’s] mouth.”69
By the time of the Roman Catholic Church’s most important
ecumenical council, the Council of Trent in 1563, the church’s internal
debate over the permissibility of proxy marriage had reached a fever
pitch again. Disagreement centered upon whether the appointment of a
proxy was to be done in the same form as the expression of consent in
the marriage ceremony itself—namely before a priest and at least two
witnesses.70 Focusing on the core intent of canon law’s ceremonial
requirement (again, to publicize the marriage to the church), the
prevailing view was that ceremonial requirements need not extend to
the contract created between an intended spouse and the proxy he
appointed to act on his behalf, as the form of this agency contract did
not bear in any way on the church’s knowledge of the marriage.71 Thus,
at the termination of Council of Trent in the late sixteenth century,
proxy marriage was still very much a part of canon law.
3. English Common Law Reception
The early English common law of marriage, much like Roman
law, focused virtually all of its marriage requirements on ensuring
the voluntary consent of both spouses. And thus, a solemn
ceremony—in which the husband pledged to love, comfort, honor, and
keep his wife in sickness and health, and to remain faithful to her,
and in which the wife vowed to do the same, and also to obey and
serve her husband—was a critical part of any English marriage
ceremony.72 Such declarations were intended to assure that the
contracting parties “seriously weigh and consider” married life and
express consent only after fully analyzing the rights and duties the
relationship would bring.73
The English ceremonial requirements necessarily raised the
question of whether marriages contracted with the parties outside
each other’s physical presence—and thus unable to make the
necessary declarations in person—could have validity. The English
answer to this question was clear. The Church of England wholly
67

Id.
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id. at 476.
71
Id.
72
WILLIAM TEGG, THE KNOT TIED: MARRIAGE CEREMONIES OF ALL NATIONS
19-20 (1877).
73
Id. at 20.
68
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adopted the canon law view of proxy marriage.74 Marriages between
absent persons could be validly contracted by letter, by messenger, or
through the use of agents.75 The only exception at English law, which
was apparently not a requirement of either the Roman or canon law
systems, was that parties to a proxy marriage “have some notice or
intelligence” of the other party to the marital relationship, “for unto
those who be utterly unknown to us, we cannot yield our Consent no
. . . more than it is possible for us to love them, of whom we have
never heard.”76
With that one narrow exception, proxy marriage was as well
accepted in England through the eighteenth century as it was in the
rest of the world.77 Indeed, proxy marriage has a place among some of
the most famous in English history. Queen Mary of England married
Philip II of Spain in a proxy ceremony in 1554, with a Count Egmont
standing in for the groom.78 Likewise, King James I of England
married Anne of Denmark in August of 1589 by proxy.79 After the
proxy ceremony, Anne set sail to Scotland but was forced by storm to
the coast of Norway; in what has been described as the “one romantic
episode of his life,” the king sailed with three hundred men to meet
his new bride.80 And proxy marriage in old England was neither
restricted to, nor practiced solely among, the nobility. Ordinary
citizens separated by substantial distances were known to perfect
marital relationships from afar as well.81
4. Proxy Marriage’s Postcolonization Survival?
When the British migrated to America in the seventeenth
century, they were said to carry their law with them, which still
legitimized proxy marriage.82 The new American colonies essentially
adopted English law after their colonization.83 It is virtually universally

74
75

Id. at 21-22; see also Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 480-81.
Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 481 (quoting SWINBURNE, ESPOUSALS 162 (2d

ed. 1711)).
76

Id.
See id. at 482. The first recorded evidence of proxy marriage in England is
in Lyndwood’s Provinciale, written in 1430. Id. at 480.
78
1 WILLIAM H. PRESCOTT, THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE
SECOND, KING OF SPAIN 90-91 (1882); TEGG, supra note 72, at 184.
79
Hugh Chisholm, Anne of Denmark, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 69-70 (11th
ed. 1910).
80
DAVID HARRIS WILLSON, KING JAMES VI AND I 85 (1956).
81
See generally SWINBURNE, supra note 75, at 162 (“Betwixt them that be
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accepted, however, that the new colonies adopted English law only to
the extent that it was suited to their unique colonial conditions.84
While there is no hard and fast evidence that colonial
American law sanctioned proxy marriage, colonial embracement of
British law strongly suggests that proxy marriage was permitted in
early America. “That [marital] consent might be expressed by an agent
was admitted by the Roman law, by the Canon law, and . . . by the
English law as late as the eighteenth century.”85 The only remaining
question is whether colonists might have rejected the British law
sanctioning proxy marriage as unsuited to the times.86 That is highly
unlikely. Proxy marriage was likely even more closely tailored to
American colonial society than it was to its British counterpart: “Many
a colonist must have left his sweetheart behind when he first ventured
over seas. [Still others] must have desired, after becoming established
in this country, to marry someone whom they had known in their
native land.”87 In either situation, a trip to the homeland merely for the
purpose of perfecting a marriage was as time consuming as it was cost
prohibitive.88 Proxy marriage was precisely the legal device to solve the
problem created by the distance gap. It “would enable the woman to
become the man’s wife before leaving her home” country on a long and
arduous journey to the colonies.89
As a result, though there is very little evidence in colonial law
of a wholesale acceptance of proxy marriage,90 its suitability for
colonial times, and the fact that American states in the decades
following colonization seemed to recognize the possibility of a proxy
marriage, make it a near certainty that proxy marriage did migrate
to the new world along with its British settlers.
5. The Twentieth Century: Marriage, War, Prostitutes, and
“Picture Brides” Intertwined
If proxy marriage was legally sanctioned in colonial America,
it went virtually unrecognized for decades. But around the turn of the
twentieth century, and for the following forty years, proxy marriage
garnered substantial new interest.91 The reason for the renewed
attention paid to the old, perhaps even dying, doctrine was clear. Two
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world wars raised new social problems to which the traditional
conception of ceremonial marriage provided no just solution.
Servicemen stationed overseas strongly desired the ability to
use proxy marriage to make formal unions for which they were unable
to express consent in the physical presence of their intended wives.
World War I, “when only four million men were in the armed forces,
occasioned a demand whose dimensions impelled the Judge Advocate
General of the Army to provide a model form of contract for marriage
by mail.”92 And by the time of World War II, “when over eleven million
persons were in the armed forces, the need for a valid form of marriage
between absent parties assumed even greater proportions.”93 Because
family law at the time branded children born outside of wedlock as
illegitimates not entitled to the same legal rights and protections as
children born of a marriage,94 there was more at stake than these
servicemen’s sense of pride and emotion. “[C]hildren fathered by
servicemen before embarkation” deserved a means of legal protection
that ceremonial marriage could not provide.95
As a result, many members of the armed forces in both world
wars engaged in proxy marriages, despite the lack of clarity as to
whether such marriages carried the force of law in early twentiethcentury America.96 Some scholars of the time argued that these
marriages were no doubt legally valid.97 Others argued that
clarification was needed on the validity of a marriage ceremony
conducted with the use of an agent.98 A few state legislatures responded
with narrowly-tailored bills that recognized the validity of proxy
marriages between absent servicemen and their partners.99 Still other
states decried the practice of proxy marriage altogether, begrudging its
perceived disastrous impact on American immigration policy.100
Regardless of the generally prevailing view of the propriety
and necessity of proxy marriages for military personnel, a growing
fear and loathing of the practical effect of a broad approval of proxy
marriage reached new heights in the 1920s. This concern was largely
fueled by immigration policy, racism, and a staunchly-held American
92
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view of love-based marriage that was not widely accepted in many
other cultures at the time.101
The crux of the growing distaste for proxy marriage stemmed
from a gate-keeping problem. If American soldiers stationed overseas
were permitted to marry their brides from a distance, then the law
effectively recognized absentee marriages conducted by proxy. And
once the law admitted the possibility of valid absentee marriages, it
was confronted with the possibility that the absent spouse might not
be an American citizen serviceman stationed abroad. Rather, an
absentee marriage with the assistance of a proxy might be conducted
between an American citizen, present in person for the marriage
ceremony, and his bride located abroad. And while the base legal
transaction was the same—one American citizen in the United States
marrying another not present in the United States for the
ceremony—perception of the two situations differed immensely. Men
who wished to marry foreign brides by proxy were dubbed scoundrels,
pimps, or worse.102
The core of the problem was that immigration rules provided
for easy, automatic, and permanent resident status in the United
States for the spouse of any American citizen.103 When American men
began to use proxy marriage to choose foreign brides who eventually
emigrated to the United States, concerns arose along two fronts.
First, the Bureau of Immigration104 became worried that the doctrine
of proxy marriage was being abused as a means of bringing foreign
prostitutes into the United States.105 That concern was racially tinged.
Immigration officials at the time “suspected all Jews at entry ports;
only Asians drew more fire.”106 Immigration agents believed that
ninety percent of Japanese and Chinese women immigrating to the
United States at the time were actually brought in as prostitutes.107
Second, even when it was clear that a proxy marriage did not involve
the immigration of a prostitute, American officials disdained the
continuation of proxy marriage and the benefits it conveyed on
spouses living abroad because they believed it led to the proliferation
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of “picture brides” entering America.108 These picture brides—the
early twentieth-century equivalent of today’s “mail order bride”109—
entered the country after a proxy marriage to an American husband,
typically without even having met him before landing on American
soil.110 Asian immigrants were again the suspect class here, with
particular scrutiny applied to marriages involving Japanese and
Korean immigrants.111 Throughout much of the twentieth century,
Asian cultures generally accepted the idea of arranged marriage,112
valuing “economic bargaining” and building “kinship networks”
through marriage.113 Such motives for marriage, however, were
antithetical to the American culture of the time, which had already
fully committed to the idea of purely love-based marriage.114
Regarding picture brides, “the whiff of compulsion of the couple by
extended family members, the possible instrumentalism of the
marriage choice, and the importance of monetary considerations all
ran against the American grain. An arranged marriage represented
coercion.”115 Thus, proxy marriage began to be viewed as a means of
skirting societal norms surrounding marriage.
Though fear was at its peak, it is still unclear precisely how
much abuse of the proxy-marriage doctrine and its resulting
immigration benefits actually existed. Newspaper headlines of the
time “screamed out . . . ‘Japanese Picture Brides Are Swarming
Here.’”116 But when “[p]ressured by the Japan Association of America,
the Bureau of Immigration conceded that only 865 proxy brides
landed in San Francisco during the year from June 1914 to June
1915. The California population at the time numbered nearly 3
million.”117 Still, due to concerns over prostitution and the motives of
those marrying by proxy, in the early 1920s, American officials took
the substantial step of declaring that “any marriage performed when
one of the parties was in the United States and the other in a foreign
country was invalid for immigration purposes.”118 The rule was
exceptionally broad, as it seemed to disapprove of all proxy marriages
no matter where perfected, at least so long as they were relied upon
108
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to confer immigration status. By 1924, then, the view of proxy
marriage began to morph, and sentiment disfavoring the doctrine
became overwhelming, even if confined to the immigration context.
To be sure, American servicemen stationed abroad continued
to use proxy marriage to perfect unions with their American brides
even after 1924 and continuing through both world wars.119 Such
unions posed no immigration complications. But in view of the
previous uncertainty over the legality of these marriages, the move
toward the rejection of proxy marriage as a viable means of perfecting
a legal union—if only in the immigration context—signaled an
important shift in American thinking. By the late 1920s, proxy
marriage was viewed, at best, as a necessity in only the most
exceptional circumstances, and even then, through skeptical lenses.120
Although proxy marriage peaked again briefly during World War II,
it became “dormant” shortly afterwards.121
B.

A Dying Institution?: The Status of Proxy Marriage Today

Today, proxy marriage enjoys mixed levels of acceptance
around the globe. In the United States, rather widespread tolerance
of the doctrine faded quickly after the Second World War.122 During
peace time, a period in which American society was less mobile,123 the
doctrine of proxy marriage fell into desuetude. It has not yet been
completely extinguished from the legal landscape in this country, but
its recognition is a rarity at best.
Internationally, the reception of proxy marriage as a valid
means of creating the spousal relationship has enjoyed far more
longevity. Greater European acceptance of proxy marriage became
evident in the early 1960s, when the United Nations Convention on
Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage, and Registration of
Marriages declined to require the presence of both parties at a
marriage ceremony in order to create a marriage that brings about
“‘the natural and fundamental group-unit of society’: the family.”124 The
United Nations’ refusal to prohibit proxy marriage was one of the most
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controversial family law issues of the Convention, with a number of
jurisdictions strongly advocating on each side of the issue.125
Indeed, the United Nations’ debate over proxy marriage
“made it clearer than the consideration of any other issue to what
extent . . . the world was still divided on the concept of marriage.”126
Even forty years after those initial United Nations discussions,
divisions persist. The American view of the impermissibility of proxy
marriage is simply not one shared globally.127
1. Limited American Law Recognition
These days, the possibility of perfecting a valid proxy
marriage in the United States has grown remote. Only a handful of
states approve the practice,128 and most do so on a very limited basis.
Moreover, even in states that rather liberally sanction the creation of
a marital relationship by proxy, little reported litigation exists to
flesh out the details of the law.
All but one of the five states allowing proxy marriage does so
expressly by statute. Kansas statutes provide perhaps the least
clarity on the issue. In its legislation detailing the solemnization
requirements of a Kansas marriage, proxy marriage is not mentioned
at all.129 Kansas simply requires a marriage license and a particular
type of officiant.130 The statute neither sanctions nor prohibits
marriages conducted by proxy.131 Nonetheless, in response to requests
for guidance from state district judges, the Kansas Attorney General
has issued a number of opinions on the validity of proxy marriages in
the state, and every Attorney General opinion on this issue since the
first in 1944 is consistent.132 In the absence of an express legislative
prohibition, proxy marriages are legal in Kansas.133 The requirement
is simply that the person who will not attend the marriage ceremony
give a valid power of attorney to the proxy.134
Texas statutes provide slightly more guidance. Persons
“unable to appear for [a marriage] ceremony” are authorized to
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appoint a proxy by affidavit.135 The statute is broad, insofar as it does
not limit the availability of proxy marriage to any particular class of
persons.136 Setting ceremonial requirements aside, Texas even allows
parties to act by proxy in seeking a marriage license,137 but only if the
party seeking the license by proxy is “on active duty as a member” of
the state or federal armed forces or “confined in a correctional
facility.”138 The Texas Attorney General has opined, in response to a
district attorney’s question, that the use of a proxy to obtain a
marriage license in Texas may even permit double proxies.139
Specifically, the Attorney General expressed that two inmates would
be permitted to obtain a marriage license while incarcerated, each
using his own proxy.140
No Texas authority extends the double proxy rule to
participation in the marriage ceremony. Nonetheless, Texas law
rather liberally permits proxy marriage in allowing any person to
utilize a proxy for the ceremony rather than limiting its use to
members of the armed forces or those incarcerated.141 The statute
requires only that the person using the proxy execute an affidavit
with detailed information about the applicant and an “appointment of
any adult . . . to act as proxy for the purpose of participating in the
ceremony.”142 No reported Texas appellate opinion applies the Texas
statute or discusses the Attorney General opinion, and thus, the
pragmatic state of Texas law on proxy marriage remains unclear.
The rules in Colorado and Montana are nearly identical. Both
states’ statutes provide,
If a party to a marriage is unable to be present at the solemnization,
such party may authorize in writing a third party to act as such
party’s proxy. If the person solemnizing the marriage is satisfied that
the absent party is unable to be present and has consented to the
marriage, such person may solemnize the marriage by proxy. If such
person is not satisfied, the parties may petition the district court for
an order permitting the marriage to be solemnized by proxy.143

Thus, both states appear to provide any party a right to marry by
proxy, for any reason, so long as he has properly appointed an agent.
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However, in April 2007, Montana departed from Colorado law
when it adopted a more stringent limitation on eligibility to marry by
proxy. Specifically, Montana limited the use of proxy marriage to military
personnel.144 Yet, even with this limitation, Montana is notorious for
having the most liberal proxy-marriage scheme in the country—the only
state allowing double proxies for the marriage ceremony.145
Finally, California expressly allows for the perfection of a
valid proxy marriage.146 California’s proxy marriage statute is both
more detailed and more stringent than those found in other states.147
The legislation allows a marriage by agent only for a member of the
United States armed forces who is “stationed overseas and serving in
a conflict or a war and is unable to appear” for the marriage
ceremony.148 Moreover, the party stationed overseas must execute a
power of attorney in writing, which must be notarized or witnessed by
two officers of the United States armed forces.149 The California proxy
does not allow the absent spouse’s agent to merely present himself for
the first time as a representative at the ceremony. Rather, to procure
the marriage license, the person appointed must personally appear
with the nonabsent spouse.150 When the marriage license is obtained,
the power of attorney is presented to the clerk, and it becomes part of
the marriage certificate thereafter.151
Although no reported appellate decision exists applying
California’s proxy marriage statute, a recent California case suggests
that state law may sanction proxy marriage even for nonmilitary
personnel. In People v. Tami, in which defendant Tami was
prosecuted for “filing a false or forged marriage license in a public
office,” a California appellate court reversed the defendant’s
conviction on grounds of insufficient evidence to demonstrate that she
knowingly filed a false or forged document.152 Interestingly, the
reversal of Tami’s conviction rests almost entirely on the lack of
clarity in California law with respect to marriage ceremonies
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completed outside of the physical presence of both spouses and an
officiant together in the same room.153
Tami did not involve the traditional circumstances giving rise
to proxy marriage (i.e., two parties separated by a great distance,
likely for employment reasons, with one authorizing a close friend or
relative to “stand in” as a result of the temporary absence). Quite to
the contrary, Tami sought to marry a man living nearby.154
Nonetheless, it was not possible for both Tami and her intended
spouse to participate in a ceremony before a qualified officiant in the
same room because her fiancé was incarcerated in the San Quentin
State Prison.155
Tami sought a marriage license from the Napa County
Recorder’s Office and told the clerk that her fiancé was “not
available” to appear.156 The clerk then gave her an affidavit of
inability to appear, advising her that she and her fiancé would need
to sign the appropriate forms and that their officiant would need to
accompany her to obtain the license.157 Tami signed her fiancé’s name,
with his authorization, by tracing his signature from other
documents.158 Tami and her officiant, a Universal Life church
minister, then went to a house where Tami, the officiant, and several
witnesses conducted a phone ceremony.159 The intended groom
participated by telephone from prison.160 Defendant Tami then
submitted a marriage certificate, bearing the signatures of all the
necessary parties, for filing with the county recorder.161 When
California prosecuted Tami for knowingly offering a false or
fraudulent document to be filed in the public records, Tami responded
that “a ‘proxy marriage’ performed with one party ‘represented by an
agent’ or present by telephone rather than ‘physically present at the
ceremony’ is valid in California.”162
In reversing Tami’s conviction, the court made no effort to
distinguish this case from a traditional proxy marriage case or to
determine whether this was even a case involving proxy marriage at
all. In one sense, a telephone marriage ceremony may seem very
different from a traditional marriage by proxy. In a telephone
marriage, the parties do not truly intend for one of them to be
represented by an agent. Rather, a party’s phone presence is his
153
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participation; no other person need “stand in” for him. On the other
hand, both a traditional proxy scenario and a telephone ceremony
raise the same core question: can the California statutory
requirement that parties declare their consent “in the physical
presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and necessary
witnesses” be met in any manner other than a personal physical
presence of all necessary persons in the same room at the same
time?163 Because that core issue is the same whether the marriage is
one of a serviceman represented by an agent or a prisoner
participating by telephone, the court focused its discussion on the
validity of proxy marriage in California.164
Unfortunately, the Tami court declined to decide whether
proxy marriages are legal in California.165 Rather, because the crime
of which Tami was convicted required a “knowing” violation of the
law, the court focused on what Tami knew or should have known
about the validity of a California proxy marriage.166
The Tami court cited three prior decisions bearing on the
validity of proxy marriage in California. In one of these decisions,
Barrons v. United States,167 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit actually applied Nevada law to a California resident.168
But, in so doing, the Barrons court first found that Nevada law
sanctioning proxy marriage does not violate any strong public policy
in California.169 The Ninth Circuit went on to say that proxy
marriages are really no different from more traditional marriages;
proxy marriages, the Barrons court noted, do not necessarily present
any serious questions of consent and are occasionally necessary for
equitable reasons.170 Twelve years later, in Bustamante v. Haet,171 a
California appellate court cited Barrons and seemed to approve of
California proxy marriages in a legal malpractice case.172 Finally,
another California appellate court decision, In re Marriage of
Dajani,173 assumed the validity of a Jordanian proxy marriage in
deciding whether to enforce a dowry contract.174 Viewing these three
163
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cases together, the Tami court described California law on the
validity of proxy marriage as “unsettled.”175 The court went on to hold
that defendant Tami’s conviction could not be upheld because there
was insufficient proof that she knew her telephone marriage was
invalid, particularly in light of the “public policy objective to promote
and protect the marriage relationship.”176
The Tami court’s reliance on at least two of three precedents to
suggest that proxy marriage is generally acceptable in California is
noticeably flawed. That California would recognize the legality of a
proxy marriage perfected in Nevada or Jordan does not mean that such
a marriage is legally sanctioned by California law. It is common under
principles of full faith and credit, and comity for one state to give effect
to a marriage validly perfected in another jurisdiction.177 Nonetheless,
the court’s reluctance to state that proxy marriage is not generally
permitted in California and its description of the law as “unsettled”
certainly suggest that California courts may be more receptive to
arguments urging the validity of proxy marriage outside the military
context than the plain language of California’s statute implies.178
The cases demonstrate that California law with regard to
proxy marriage is clear on at least one front: marriage by proxy is
expressly and clearly sanctioned by statute for certain members of
the armed services. For ordinary citizens, Tami signals that state law
on proxy marriage may be in flux.
Even beyond the five states that expressly allow it, however,
proxy marriage has significant legal effects. In states that require both
spouses to be physically present at the marriage ceremony and do not
allow spouses to use agents to perfect a ceremonial marriage,179 proxy
marriages are almost always recognized and given legal effect if they
are perfected in a state that permits them.180 As a result, the impact of
the legality of proxy marriage is felt throughout the United States.
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2. More Fulsome Recognition Abroad
Outside of the United States, proxy marriage is far better
recognized, particularly in Central and South American countries.
Brazil,181 Argentina,182 Colombia,183 Bolivia,184 Peru,185 Uruguay,186
Venezuela,187 Ecuador,188 Panama,189 El Salvador,190 Costa Rica,191
Mexico,192 and Cuba193 all permit a party to fulfill the requirements of
a ceremonial marriage through the use of an agent.194 It is perhaps
not so surprising that these countries share in the acceptance of
181

CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 201 (Braz.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF BRAZIL 53-54
(Joseph Wheless trans., 1920) (“The marriage may be celebrated by power of attorney
containing special powers to the mandatary to receive, in the name of the grantor, the
other party.”).
182
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 173 (Arg.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF ARGENTINA 37
(Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2008) (“Marriage at a distance is one in which the absentee
party expresses his consent before the competent authority to officiate at marriage
ceremonies at the place where he is. The documentation verifying the absentee’s consent
can only be offered within ninety days of the date when it was granted.”).
183
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 114 (Colom.).
184
CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 55 (Bol.).
185
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 264 (Peru).
186
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 100 (Uru.).
187
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 67 (Venez.).
188
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 101 (Ecuador).
189
CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in THE CIVIL CODE OF
PANAMA 294-95 (Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2009) (“Marriage can be contracted by the
appearance before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of
the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of
attorney, by notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at
the place of officiating of the official that is to celebrate the marriage is always
necessary. The power of attorney must express the name of the person with whom the
marriage is to be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person,
and the marriage shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been
given to the empowered agent, in due form, prior to the celebration of the marriage.”).
190
CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30 (El Sal.).
191
CÓDIGO DE FAMILIA art. 30 (Costa Rica).
192
CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL art. 102 (Mex.), translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE
OF MEXICO 17 (Julio Romañach, Jr., trans., 2003) (“The parties or their specially
empowered agents, constituted in the manner provided in Article 44, as well as two
witnesses to each of the parties that verify their identity, must be present before the
Civil Registry judge at the place, day and hour designated for the celebration of the
marriage.”); id. art. 44 (“When the interested parties cannot personally appear, they
can be represented by a mandatary (agent) specially empowered for the act, whose
appointment must be made at least by private writing made before two witnesses. In
cases involving marriage . . . a power of attorney given by notarial act or mandate
(agency) given by private writing signed by the principal and two witnesses, the
signatures being ratified before a notary public, a family court judge, a juvenile court
judge, or a justice of the peace is required.”).
193
CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 10 (Cuba).
194
See, e.g., CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in THE CIVIL
CODE OF PANAMA, supra note 189, at 294-95 (“Marriage can be contracted by the
appearance before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of
the parties and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of
attorney, by notarial act . . . .”).
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proxy marriage, as they are all civilian jurisdictions with legal
systems derived from Roman law,195 which always permitted
marriages by proxy.196 These countries simply carried forward the
Roman law allowing the use of agents in perfecting a marital
contract.197 Much of Europe still permits marriages perfected by proxy
as well, and likely for the same historical reasons. The doctrine still
exists in France,198 Spain,199 Italy,200 and Poland.201 Finally, virtually all
of the countries governed by Islamic law sanction proxy marriage202
and do so very broadly, allowing double proxies203 and often giving the
proxy “unlimited discretion” to enter into marriage contracts,
including the power to choose a mate on behalf of the principal.204
Overall, the global community is far more liberal in permitting
the application of agency principles to the marital relationship.205 And
this widespread acceptance of proxy marriage is significant because it
bleeds into America. Even if we refuse to recognize proxy marriages
celebrated within American borders, we do give effect to such
marriages validly perfected abroad.206 Thus, the general legal attitude
195

Hans Kirchberger, The Significance of Roman Law for the Americas and
Its Importance to Inter-American Relations, 1944 WIS. L. REV. 249, 255.
196
See supra Part I.A.1.
197
See supra Part I.A.1.
198
CODE CIVIL art. 96-1 (Fr.) (only for “servicemen, sailors of the State, or persons
employed to follow the armies or on board State vessels” (author’s translation)).
199
CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 87 (Spain), translated in CLIFFORD STEVENS WILSON,
THE CIVIL LAW IN SPAIN AND SPANISH-AMERICA 141 (1900) (“Marriages shall be
celebrated personally or by a proxy to whom a special power has been granted; but the
presence of the contracting party who is domiciled or resides in the district of the Judge
who is to authorize the marriage shall always be necessary. The name of the person
with whom the marriage is to be celebrated shall be expressed in the special power,
and such power shall be valid if, before its celebration, the person so authorized should
not have been notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power.”).
200
Only members of the armed forces may marry by proxy under Italian law or
those in extraordinary circumstances. CODICE CIVILE art. 111 (It.) (“The military and
persons who by reason of their duties are attached to the armed forces can celebrate
marriage by proxy in war time. Celebration of marriage by proxy can also take place if
one of the future spouses resides abroad and serious reasons exist, to be appraised by the
tribunal in whose jurisdiction the other future spouse resides.” (author’s translation)).
201
FAM. CODE art. 6 (Pol.).
202
See C.M. SHAFQAT, THE MUSLIM MARRIAGE, DOWER AND DIVORCE 35-36 (1955).
203
See Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368.
204
Id.
205
See id. at 365-68. England, however, ended its long-lasting approval of
proxy marriages in 1844 with the case of Regina v. Millis in which the English House
of Lords declared that it has never been the English law that a marriage confected
without a ceremony was a valid marriage. Lorenzen, supra note 41, at 482 (citing
Regina v. Mills, (1844) 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (H.L.)); see also 2 POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 62, at 370.
206
See Cosulich Societe Triestina Di Navigazione v. Elting, 66 F.2d 534 (2d
Cir. 1933) (describing a willingness of many American courts to recognize proxy
marriages that are valid where they are contracted); Silva v. Tillinghast, 36 F.2d 801
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1929); Kane v. Johnson, 13 F.2d 432 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1926); United
States ex rel. Modianos v. Tuttle, 12 F.2d 927 (E.D. La. 1925); Ex parte Suzanna, 295 F.
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toward the use of agents to perfect the marriage contract around the
globe is important in shaping American policy.
II.

AGENCY IN INTIMATE RELATIONSHIPS

Since the start of agency theory’s recognition thousands of
years ago, the powers permissibly delegated to an agent have been
exceptionally broad.207 Traditionally, a valid agency relationship could
be created for any lawful purpose.208 The only remaining question was
whether the principal himself had the authority to do what he
appointed an agent to do.209 Indeed, there are generally only two
exceptions to the theory that an agent can be appointed to do
anything that the principal himself can do.210 First, agency authority
may not be created for the performance of an act that is unlawful or
otherwise violates public policy.211 Second, the nondelegable-acts
doctrine212 prohibits agency delegation of acts that are exceptionally
“personal in . . . nature.”213
Precisely what falls within the nondelegable-acts doctrine has
been a tricky question for courts and legal scholars. The theory is
clear enough: acts that rest upon some special skill or personal
quality of the principal must be performed by the principal alone, and
their performance may not be delegated to another.214 In practice,
however, it has been nearly impossible to determine precisely where
the line between intimate, nondelegable acts and those for which
agency principles may freely apply should be drawn.215 Still, agency
scholars have spoken rather confidently for years about a select few
intimate relationships.216 Because “[i]t is expected that [a] testator
will exercise his own judgment concerning his relationship [with his
would-be] donees, their needs, his obligations to them, and the like,”
proxy will-making has long been considered precisely the type of
transaction covered under the nondelegable-acts doctrine.217 Creation
of custodial rights over a child has also been viewed as an intimate

713 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1924); United States ex rel. Aznar v. Comm’r of Immigration, 298
F. 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
207
Mark Fowler, Appointing an Agent to Make Medical Treatment Choices, 84
COLUM. L. REV. 985, 1015 (1984).
208
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 80.
209
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 cmt. b (2006).
210
Id. § 3.05 cmt. b.
211
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 81.
212
See Fowler, supra note 207, at 1010 (defining the “nondelegable acts doctrine”).
213
See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 81.
214
Id.
215
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.04 (2006); Fowler, supra note
207, at 1010 (“The basic policy underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some
decisions should be made personally—or not made at all.”).
216
See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126.
217
Id.; see also Fowler, supra note 207, at 1009.
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act unsuitable for agency’s application.218 Medical decision-making
historically was excluded from the domain of agency.219 And, of course,
taking marriage vows by proxy is not generally tolerated.220
With the sole exception of marriage, however, in the last
thirty years, legal thinking on the propriety of agency law’s
application to each of these intimate relationships has changed
drastically. While once described as “doubtless” nondelegable acts,221
proxy will-making,222 contracts to transfer child custody,223 and grants
of authority to another to make health care decisions224 are now all
permissible. Only marriage remains an intimate transaction not yet
reevaluated under the nondelegable-acts doctrine.
A.

Will-Making by Proxy: A “Notably New Development”225

Much like the contract of marriage, the making of a will
“holds a unique and revered position in our collective psyche.”226 A will
is among the most personal and significant legal acts in which a
person engages.227 Nonetheless, the use of agents in will-making has
long been recognized as a means of carrying out necessary will
formalities.228 In the last twenty years, the use of agency principles in
the will context has increased to such a degree that, for the first time
in history, an agent may even make dispositions, essentially creating
an entire will on the testator’s behalf.229 The acceptance of proxy willmaking has progressed slowly and is continuing still, but it signals a
substantial erosion of the theory that agency principles are
necessarily inappropriate for application to intimate affairs.
When considering a person’s ability to legally use a proxy in
creating a will, the distinction between a “proxy signature” and a true
“proxy will” must be closely observed. The two have been treated
218

See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126 (describing consent to an adoption as an
act too personal to be done with the use of agency).
219
See Fowler, supra note 207, at 1010 (describing scholarly speculation that
medical decisionmaking was an act too personal to be delegated).
220
See MECHEM, supra note 14, § 126.
221
Id.
222
See infra Part II.A.
223
See infra Part II.B.
224
See infra Part II.C.
225
Ralph C. Brashier, Policy, Perspective, and the Proxy Will, 61 S.C. L. REV.
63, 105 (2009).
226
Id. at 93.
227
See In re Estate of Hart, 295 P.2d 985, 1002 (Wyo. 1956) (“It is, and for
many centuries has been, a common thought in our economic system, that to execute a
last will and testament is the most solemn and sacred act of a man’s life.”); I.J.
Hardingham, The Rule Against Delegation of Will-Making Power, 9 MELB. U. L. REV.
650, 651 (1974) (“It has been argued that the power to make a will, to exclude next of
kin, is a personal privilege which may be delegated to no other.”).
228
See infra text accompanying note 230.
229
See infra text accompanying notes 239-64.
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differently for centuries, with the idea of a proxy signature in a will
being far more accepted.230
It is often possible that a testator unable to comply with willmaking form requirements (perhaps because he is physically
incapable of signing his will) may use an agent to execute a will in
proper form.231 Typically, state laws require that the infirm testator
signify that the instrument at issue is, in fact, his testament and then
direct a proxy to sign his name.232 Even the Uniform Probate Code,
which clearly prefers a will signed by the testator himself, allows a
will to be signed instead “by some other individual in the testator’s
conscious presence and by the testator’s direction.”233
Such a proxy transaction differs from proxy marriage in one
significant way. In the wills context, the testator himself is present
when the agent signs,234 while the very purpose of sanctioning proxy
marriage is to allow marriages to take place between parties at a
distance.235 Nonetheless, both situations involve nothing more than the
legal acceptance of an alternate means of complying with a form
requirement—in the case of a will, typically the signature of two
witnesses or acknowledgment before a notary,236 and in a marriage, a
ceremonial declaration of consent.237 That the law has sanctioned use of
an agent to comply with will formalities suggests that the formalities a
party must accomplish to enter into the marriage contract should be
permissibly accomplished with the aid of an agent as well.
Even more compelling is the recent shift toward applying
agency principles to allow a person not only to sign a will on the

230

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502 (amended 2008).
See Brashier, supra note 225, at 92.
232
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1578 (2009).
233
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502. The Uniform Probate Code has been adopted
in part by two states, and in its entirety (with some modifications) by the following
sixteen states: Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Maine, Michigan,
Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Carolina, South
Dakota, and Utah. ALASKA STAT. §§ 13.06.005-.36.390 (2007); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 14-1101 to -7308 (2005 & Supp. 2008); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-10-101 to -17103 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 655.82, 711.50-.512, 731.005-735.302, 737.101-.627
(West 2004 & Supp. 2009); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 539-1 to -12, 560:1-101 to 560:8-101
(2006); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 15-1-101 to -7-308 (2006 & Supp. 2008); ME. REV. STAT. tit.
18-A §§ 1-101 to 8-401 (1998 & Supp. 2009); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 700.1101-.8102
(West 1995 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 524.1-101 to 524.8-103 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2008); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 72-1-101 to 72-6-311 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 302201 to -2902 (1995); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-1-101 to -7-522 (West 2003); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 30.1-01-01 to -35-01 (1996 & Supp. 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-6-10 to -100,
62-1-100 to -7-604 (1987 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 29A-1-101 to -8-101
(2004 & Supp. 2008); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-1-101 to -8-101 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008).
234
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502.
235
See Moore, supra note 16, at 313 (“[I]t is only during wartime that
marriage by proxy is of great utility, since only then are a substantial number of lovers
forcibly separated for protracted periods.”).
236
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a)(3)(B).
237
See supra notes 11-12 for ceremonial requirements of marriage.
231
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principal’s behalf but to actually decide upon dispositions for the
principal, essentially creating an entire will for him. Historically, it
was impossible to create a valid will by proxy. Roman law dating back
to the sixth century rejected the practice,238 viewing a will made by
anyone other than the testator as a will that could not be regarded as
the testator’s will at all.239 Agency theory was well recognized in both
early Roman and English law;240 it simply was not applied in the wills
context.241 Will-making was viewed as an “inalienable right” early in
the law’s development.242 And many centuries later, that view
generally persists both in the United States and abroad.243
However, in seven states and under the Uniform Probate
Code, recent changes allow the conservator of an incapacitated person
to make a will on the incapacitated’s behalf.244 Though the rule applies
only in situations involving conservatorship, agency principles are the
backbone of this legal development.245 A conservator-agent makes a

238

ROSCOE POUND, READINGS IN ROMAN LAW 26 (1906) (describing the
impermissibility of proxy wills in the time of Justinian’s Digest).
239
See Brashier, supra note 225, at 63 n.2 (describing the testator himself as the
only person with the ability to design and implement his own plan); cf. MIN SHANG FA
SHIWU YANJIU: JICHENG JUAN [A STUDY OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL LAW PRACTICE:
INHERITANCE VOLUME] 103 (Yang Zhenshan ed., 1993) (proxy wills enforced in China as
formally defective wills that make dispositions to “worthy” family members).
240
See Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1615,
1627-28 (1992).
241
See POUND, supra note 238, at 26 (describing the impermissibility of proxy
wills at Roman law); Hardingham, supra note 227, at 652 (“It would seem to be true to
say that, in England at least, the rule is ‘simply a rule that no settlor and no testator
may by means of either power or trust delegate to others the selection of beneficiaries
from a limited but uncertain class’ for uncertainty has been the vice in all cases
wherein the rule has been applied.”) (citing I.D. Campbell, The Enigma of General
Powers of Appointment, 7 RES JUDICATAE 244, 252-53 (1955-1957)).
242
See Statute of Wills, 1540, 32 Hen. 8, c. 1, § 4 (Eng.) (“[E]very person . . .
shall have full and free liberty, power and authority to give, dispose, will and devise . . .
at his free will and pleasure . . . .”); In re Runals’ Estate, 328 N.Y.S.2d 966, 976 (Sur.
Ct. 1972); In re Nagle’s Estate, 317 N.E.2d 242, 245 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974). But see J.C.
Shepherd, When the Common Law Fails, 9 EST. & TR. J. 117, 129 (1989) (“Over-all, it is
important to understand that the power to decide on the disposition of your own
private property is a power delegated by society to individuals as those in the best
position to make the most reasonable disposition of the property. It is not some sort of
inalienable right. Indeed, the whole principle of giving testatory power to individuals
arose during a time when only a small portion of one’s private property could be passed
on in a discretionary way. The vast majority of one’s estate would normally pass by
operation of law to one’s heirs, and will-making was often a supplementary activity.”).
243
See, e.g., Hardingham, supra note 227, at 652 (comparative discussion of
the rule against delegation of will-making power in England and Australia).
244
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13) (West 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-14411(1)(g) (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411(a)(7) (LexisNexis 2005);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7) (West Supp. 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 524.5-411(a)(9) (West Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a) (West 2009);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 29A-5-420(8) (2004); UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7), (b)
(amended 2008).
245
See Brashier, supra note 225, at 102-03.
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will on behalf of his principal when the principal is incapacitated and
therefore unable to act personally.246
The idea of a conservator as proxy will-maker is a new one.
Conservators hold great power to act on behalf of the incapacitated
persons they protect.247 But even so, a conservator’s power to act on
behalf of a protected party has historically excluded will-making
authority.248 It is only in the last twenty years that states have begun
to accept the conservator’s making of a will for the incapacitated
party.249 And, as of 2008, the Uniform Probate Code now even
sanctions the conservator’s power to make, amend, or revoke a will on
behalf of a protected person.250
The theory legitimizing such conduct is one of “substituted
judgment.”251 Proxy wills made by conservators are said to “reflect a
substituted judgment of what the protected person would want had
he retained capacity.”252 Moreover, the extension of will-making power
to a conservator has increasingly been deemed necessary as a matter
of equity given the breadth of a conservator’s authority.253
Conservators already have the power to dispose of their protected
persons’ property in a substantial way by “engag[ing] in inter vivos
estate planning through will substitutes,”254 and thus, granting willmaking power to conservators does not represent a severe extension
of the powers they already hold over the property of the protected
person.255 Perhaps more importantly, allowing a conservator to draft a
will may be the only way to accomplish what the incapacitated person
needs or clearly desires—whether that is revoking a disposition,
changing a beneficiary, or creating a will from scratch to avoid the
disposition rules of intestate succession.256 “[W]hy should a
conservator not be able to accomplish directly by will precisely what
the protected person would have accomplished had she retained
testamentary capacity?”257 Responding sympathetically to that

246

Id. at 92.
Id.
248
Id.
249
CAL. PROB. CODE § 2580(b)(13); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15-14-411(1)(g);
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 560:5-411(a)(7); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 190B, § 5-407(d)(7);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 524.5-411(a)(9); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159.078(1)(a); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 464-A:26-a (West 2010).
250
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411(a)(7) (amended 2008).
251
See Brashier, supra note 225, at 87-89.
252
Id. at 68. More recently, states have gone beyond the substituted judgment
doctrine, in the face of much scholarly criticism, and approved wills made by
conservators if they make reasonable dispositions in the best interest of the protected
party. Id. at 88-89.
253
Id. at 68.
254
Id. at 92.
255
Id.
256
Id.
257
Id.
247
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question, the developing trend in state law is to allow proxy wills by
conservator, with protections to minimize the risk of abuse.258
Still, the reality of increasing acceptance for proxy will-making
by conservators does not equate to widespread acceptance of proxy willmaking in general. Outside the conservatorship context, when a
testator remains fully capable of making his own will, his ability to
delegate that power to an agent is less clear. The Uniform Probate
Code, which expressly sanctions will-making by conservator, is silent
on the application of agency principles to will-making absent
conservatorship.259 The Uniform Power of Attorney Act, which provides
default rules regarding the creation and scope of powers of attorney,
likewise takes no stance on proxy will-making by agents generally.260
At least two states have been more explicit. California
legislation provides that “[a] power of attorney may not authorize an
attorney-in-fact to make, publish, declare, amend, or revoke the
principal’s will.”261 In Arkansas, an appellate decision stated in dicta
that agency principles could not support an agent’s making of a will
on behalf of the principal, describing “the decision of who, what,
when, and how one’s property is to be distributed upon death” as a
personal one that may be made only by the testator himself.262
Elsewhere, state law remains mute on proxy will-making by agent.
It may well be that will-making by a nonconservator agent is
never fully accepted by state law, but the recent extension of willmaking powers to conservators—which would not have been
sanctioned in any state twenty years ago—certainly signals a change
in our view of will-making as a task too personal for the application of
258

See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-411 (amended 2008). Section 5-411 states that
“[a]fter notice to interested persons and upon express authorization of the court, a
conservator may . . . make, amend or revoke the protected person’s will.” Id. § 5411(a)(7). Not only must the conservator comply with the state’s formalities for
executing wills, but
[t]he court, in exercising or in approving a conservator’s exercise of the
powers listed in subsection (a), shall consider primarily the decision that the
protected person would have made . . . [and also] shall consider (1) the
financial needs of the protected person and the needs of individuals who are
in fact dependent on the protected person for support and the interest of
creditors; (2) possible reduction of income, estate, inheritance, or other tax
liabilities; (3) eligibility for governmental assistance; (4) the protected
person’s previous pattern of giving or level of support; (5) the existing estate
plan; (6) the protected person’s life expectancy and the probability that the
conservatorship will terminate before the protected person’s death; and (7)
any other factors the court considers relevant.
Id. § 5-411(c).
259
Brashier, supra note 225, at 101-02.
260
UNIF. POWER OF ATTORNEY ACT §§ 104, 114 (2006).
261
CAL. PROB. CODE § 4265 (West 2009); see also Brashier, supra note 225, at
101-02. Louisiana law provides similarly. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1571 (2010)
(prohibiting testaments “executed by a mandatary for the testator”).
262
In re Estate of Garrett, 100 S.W.3d 72, 76 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003); see also
Brashier, supra note 225, at 102.
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agency principles. At least where the equities shift in favor of
allowing someone other than the testator to make his will because the
testator can no longer do so himself, concerns over the intimate
nature of will-making have been shoved aside. One scholar has
persuasively argued that the evolution of the law on will-making by
conservators does, and indeed should, begin to compel movement in
state law toward accepting wills made through agents more
generally.263 As someone “personally selected by the protected person
and presumably . . . in the best position to know what the protected
person would desire,” an agent is even better suited to make a will on
his principal’s behalf than is a conservator.264 With protections for the
testator—perhaps including a requirement that authority to make a
will be given expressly—even proxy will-making by agent may garner
more widespread approval.
And even if proxy will-making by agent is never fully
accepted, the “notably new development” of affording conservators the
power to make wills on behalf of the parties they protect has
significant implications in the marital context.265 The penetration of
agency rules into will-making, even by conservator, more heavily
intrudes into a personal province than does the creation of a marriage
by proxy. A conservator or agent making a will for the person he
represents makes exceptionally detailed and intimate decisions,
necessarily identifying objects of bounty for the testator and selecting
the terms of his dispositions.266 By contrast, an agent in a proxy
marriage merely carries out the necessary formalities of a contract,
the details of which the principal has already expressed his approval.
In contrast to the proxy will-maker, then, there is no real discretion
to be exercised by an agent in the marriage context. The law’s
recognition of the need to allow will-making by proxy highlights the
logic of also recognizing marriages by proxy, particularly because the
manner in which an agent is used in proxy marriage and his function
in that context is comparatively minor and ministerial.
B.

Delegating a Child’s Care, Custody, and Control

The relationship between parent and child is viewed as one of
the most sacred under the law. The law serves to protect that bond in
myriad ways,267 and interference with parental decision-making for
children must tread lightly or risk trampling a parent’s Troxel263

Brashier, supra note 225, at 102.
Id. at 101. Brashier deftly discusses potential problems raised by the
distinction between conservator and agent will-making and provides a rationale for
extending will-making powers to both groups. Id. at 101-04.
265
Id. at 105.
266
See id. at 92-93.
267
See Michael D. Moberly, Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard:
Advocating the Recognition of a Parent-Child Privilege in Arizona, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
515, 538 (2003).
264
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recognized constitutional rights.268 The mere existence of a biological
link between parents and children creates not only parental rights,
but also substantial responsibilities. Parents are required to support
their children, to provide for their care—even to educate them269 and
to foster their well-being.270 These duties generally cannot be
abdicated,271 and the government takes Herculean steps to ensure
that parents respect the relationship by fulfilling their legal
responsibilities toward their children.272 The parent-child relationship,
then, is most certainly a heavily protected one, regulated in large part
because of its highly intimate nature.273 The law of contract would
seem to have little application in this intimate context. But even here,
agency principles permeate the relationship in a significant way.
Most notably, agency doctrine encroaches upon the very
personal parent-child relationship in the custody context. In every
state, custody is viewed through the lens of the best interest of the
child.274 Natural parents generally exercise custody unless a court
268

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 69-70 (2000) (although court-ordered
visitation may be the only way to protect a child from severe psychological harm in
circumstances where a child has enjoyed a substantial relationship with a non-parent,
a Washington statute authorizing court-ordered visitation was unconstitutional
because it allowed courts to order visitation on a mere “best interests” standard, i.e.,
without necessary regard to the wishes of the parents). For a discussion of Troxel, see
David D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48
UCLA L. REV. 1125, 1135-37 (2001).
269
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 227 (2009) (“Fathers and mothers, by the
very act of marrying, contract together the obligation of supporting, maintaining, and
educating their children.”).
270
See Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the
Mess?, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 340 (2002) (“[A]dherents of modernity in the domestic
arena also generally value traditional goals—affectionate, committed families, raising
secure, happy children.”).
271
See, e.g., In re Gates’ Adoption, 85 N.E.2d 597 (Ohio App. 1948); In re
Wilcox Adoption, 349 P.2d 862 (Or. 1960); Whitton v. Scott, 144 A.2d 706 (Vt. 1958).
272
See LeAnn Larson LaFave, Origins and Evolution of the Best Interests of
the Child Standard, 34 S.D. L. REV. 459, 486-88 (1989) (arguing that despite the law’s
rule that custody determinations are based on the “best interests of the child,” both
statutes and jurisprudence encourage parents in a custody battle to show who is the
better parent and not necessarily the best interests of the child).
273
See Moberly, supra note 267, at 538.
274
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1998); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.150 (2007); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403 (2007 & Supp. 2008); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101 (West
2009); CAL. FAM. CODE § 3040 (West 1986 & Supp. 2009); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1410-124 (West 2007 & Supp. 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-56 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 728 (2006 & Supp. 2010); D.C. CODE § 16-914 (2001);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (West 1997 & Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-9-3 (West 2003
& Supp. 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (2005 & Supp. 2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32717 (2006 & Supp. 2008); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/602 (West 2002 & Supp. 2009);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-17-2-13 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (2000); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (West
2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (2008); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAW § 9-105 (1994);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 208, § 31 (West 1998 & Supp. 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 722.27 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 2002 &
Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.375 (West
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finds that such an arrangement is not in the child’s best interest.275
And when a nonparent is embroiled in a custody dispute with a
parent, a court not only considers the child’s best interest, but also
must typically make a finding that custody in a parent would result
in substantial harm to the child before awarding custody to a
nonparent.276 The heightened standard is, again, a function of the
notion that the parent-child relationship is an important one that
must suffer minimal intrusion.277 The court serves as gatekeeper of
the intimate relationship between parent and child. Even so, in the
last fifteen years, the law has begun to rather freely recognize the
right of a parent to utilize agency principles to confer custody of a
minor child, albeit temporarily, to an agent.
Agency principles have begun to apply rather purely, even in
the heavily regulated custody regime, through doctrines alternatively
dubbed “provisional custody by mandate,” “custodial power of
attorney,” or “standby guardianship.” In provisional custody by
mandate, a parent with custody—or both parents, if married—
designate a mandatary or agent278 to “provide for the care, custody,
and control of a minor child.”279 The agent’s authority is merely
2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-212 (2007); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42-364 (LexisNexis
2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 125.480 (West 2008); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:23
(2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23.2 (1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (West 2003); N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW § 240 (McKinney 1999 & Supp. 2010); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 50-13.2
(West 2000 & Supp. 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-09-05.1 (2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3109.04 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 112 (West 2001 &
Supp. 2009); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.169 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); 23 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 5303 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (2006); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 20-3-160 (1985 & Supp. 2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-4-45 (2004);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (West 2005 & Supp. 2007); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN.
§ 153.002 (West 2006); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-10 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, § 665 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (West 2001); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.10.100 (West 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-9-101 (West 2004); WIS. STAT.
ANN. § 767.41 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 20-2-201 (2007).
275
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 131 (2009).
276
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 727 (2008) (“The Court shall not restrict
the rights of a child or a parent under this subsection unless it finds, after a hearing,
that the exercise of such rights would endanger a child’s physical health or
significantly impair his or her emotional development.”).
277
See Dolgin, supra note 270, at 387-88 (“The invocation of Meyer and Pierce
by the plurality in Troxel serves two contradictory ends. It reflects the law’s
commitment to protect familial relationships from excessive state intervention that is
presumed by revisionists to be the popular conception of Justice McReynolds’s decisions
in those cases. But the invocation also reflects a vision of family that values hierarchy
and the ‘isolation’ of the child from a community of extended kin.” (citing Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the Child as
Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997-98 (1992))).
278
Mandate is the civil law’s terminology for the agency contract. See LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 2989 (2009). In the mandate relationship, the person to whom
authority is conferred is known as the mandatary, and the person conferring authority,
as in the common law, is called the principal. Thus, “provisional custody by mandate”
is nothing more than civilian terminology for the conference of custody by agency
contract. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951.
279
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:951.
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temporary under these contractual delegations of custody.280
Louisiana, which has perhaps the most detailed statutory scheme,
allows a parent to grant custody to an agent by contract for a
maximum period of one year and provides that the contract may
terminate even earlier for prescribed causes, including revocation of
agency authority, renunciation by the agent, or lapse of time after the
death of the principal.281 Other states’ statutory schemes are less
comprehensive but largely provide for the same contractual agency
relationship. In the District of Columbia, a child’s parent may grant
another person a “revocable custodial power of attorney” to provide
for the child’s care.282 In Pennsylvania, standby guardianship rules—
which, in most states, act as a “springing guardianship” to allow a
parent to name a guardian who will assume authority for a child only
upon the parent’s death and after court approval283—extend to permit
the mere written designation of a standby guardian to take effect
immediately upon execution.284 The standby guardian can act as the
guardian of the minor without the direction of the court for a period of
sixty days, after which the guardian must file a petition for approval
to continue.285 In each of these cases, then, parents confer the most
sacred of rights to an agent by mere execution of a contract and
without court oversight or control.
Parents have used these rules to transfer temporary custody
to agents, most frequently grandparents and aunts,286 for a variety of
reasons ranging from illness and hospitalization to military
deployments overseas to changes of residency for purposes of
enrolling in a better public school.287 While the conferment of rights
and duties as serious as those inherent in the parent-child
relationship may seem inappropriately delegated through simple
contract, the law recognizes such transfers out of perceived necessity.
No other legal device allows parents to retain custody—and thereby
avoid relinquishing it entirely on a permanent basis—while still

280

See, e.g., id. § 9:952.
Id.
282
D.C. CODE § 21-2301 (2007); see also Laura Weinrib, Kinship Care Reform:
A Proposal for Consent Legislation in Massachusetts, 87 MASS. L. REV. 23, 23 n.6 (2002)
(describing power of attorney’s use to “accommodate kinship caregivers”).
283
See, e.g., CAL. PROB. CODE § 1502 (West 2002).
284
23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5612 (West 2001 & Supp. 2008).
285
Id. § 5613 (West 2001).
286
See Lenore M. Molee, The Ultimate Demonstration of Love for a Child:
Choosing a Standby Guardian New Jersey Standby Guardianship Act, 22 SETON HALL
LEGIS. J. 475, 496 (1998) (citing Carol Levine et al., In Whose Care and Custody?
Placements and Policies for Children Whose Parents Die of AIDS, Final Report to the
United Hospital Fund (The Orphan Project, New York, N.Y.), Nov. 7, 1994, at 4
(recommending that the custodial parent select an individual known and trusted by the
child, such as a grandparent or aunt)).
287
Greg Garland, Pointe Coupee to Amend Enrollment, ADVOCATE, May 12,
2009, at 2B, available at http://2theadvocate.com/news/44759202.html?showAll=y&c=y.
281
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providing for the care of a child when they cannot, or perhaps do not
wish to, do so.
Once again, equity permits the intrusion of agency principles
into a bond perhaps even more intimate than that between spouses.
Agency is even used in this context to create a relationship whereby a
person exercises care, custody, and control over a minor child.
Logic and consistency compel a reevaluation of the creation of
a marital relationship through agency as well. Such a reevaluation is
particularly appropriate considering that an agent exercising custody
makes many significant and repeated decisions for the child’s welfare,
typically unguided by the wishes of the principal. In the proxy
marriage context, by contrast, the proxy makes no significant choices
on behalf of the principal. The decision to enter into the marital
relationship is made even before the proxy’s appointment and the
proxy’s role is merely to serve as a stand-in to fulfill a form
requirement. If agency has application in creating far more
significant and personal custodial relationships, it should apply to
create spousal relationships as well.
C.

Death by Agent

At common law, it has been frequently observed that “no right
is held more sacred, or is more carefully guarded . . . than the right of
every individual to the possession and control of his own person, free
from all restraint or interference of others.”288 The right to autonomy
over one’s body is rooted in a constitutional right of privacy and has
been held to extend to freedom in approving of or rejecting medical
treatment.289 Consistent with that right, American courts in the last
thirty years have gradually recognized an individual’s right not only
to make medical decisions for himself, but to appoint an agent for
that purpose, even where the decision making involves critical
questions implicating life and death.
Legal recognition of the applicability of agency principles in
medical decision-making has come about rather slowly. Traditionally,
agency doctrine could not apply to most health care situations in
which it was truly needed. At common law, an agency relationship
terminated automatically at the incapacity of the principal.290 Since
the help of another in engaging in medical decision-making is
288

Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
Fowler, supra note 207, at 988-89.
290
MECHEM, supra note 14, § 677. For a justification of this rule, see id. § 676
(“The act of every agent exercising a bare power or authority necessarily presupposes,
as has been seen, the existence of a principal competent to perform the same act
himself in his own behalf. It is his will that is being carried out through the medium of
the agent. If for any reason, therefore, the principal becomes incapable of acting and
exercising an intelligent will in regard to the transaction, it is evident that an essential
element in the relation is lacking, and while that element remains absent, the further
exercise of the relation must be suspended.”).
289
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typically needed only when the interested party himself is
incapacitated and thus unable to personally make those decisions,291
prior agency appointments were virtually useless in conveying
decision-making authority for critical health care matters.292 However,
this result was not viewed as exceptionally problematic to scholars in
the early twentieth century, as there was much speculation at the
time that “medical decision-making might fall within [the] narrow
category of actions too personal to be delegated.”293
Beginning in the 1970s, however, the power of attorney was
gradually revolutionized to allow agency authority to persist beyond
the principal’s incapacity.294 States, and even the Uniform Probate
Code in 1969, began to recognize the “durable power of attorney”—
durable in the sense that it would endure past the incapacity of the
principal and up to the moment of his death.295 Such a power of
attorney could, in accordance with the state law and the desires of the
principal, either come into effect immediately upon execution or
“spring” into effect upon the occurrence of a triggering event such as
the principal’s incapacity,296 without the need for any court approval
or proceeding.297 In either event, the durable power of attorney was a
useful extension of traditional common law agency principles because
it allowed the agent to continue to act with respect to the principal’s
affairs—managing his finances and buying and selling property—
when the principal was unable to do so himself.298 As a result, the
durable power of attorney has long been viewed as a logical and
equitable extension of agency law insofar as it gives a trusted person
exercising substituted judgment the authority to act in a manner that
the principal likely would have desired.299 By 1984, the durable power
of attorney was a part of the law in all fifty states.300
Still, the clear extension of the durable power of attorney to
medical decision-making has come about more slowly as a result of
the perception that the authority to make life and death decisions on
behalf of another might just be a “nondelegable” act outside the ambit
of agency law.301 The concern, of course, is that the agent wields

291

Fowler, supra note 207, at 1012 n.174.
Id. at 1014-15.
293
Id. at 1009.
294
Id. at 1012 n.174.
295
UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-501 (amended 2008).
296
Legal Problems of the Aged and Infirm—The Durable Power of Attorney—
Planned Protective Services and the Living Will, 13 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 1, 3 (1978).
297
Id.
298
Id. at 7.
299
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1002 (“[T]he agency approach would permit the
patient to choose the person he most trusts to represent his interests—someone who
shares, or would at least be faithful to, the patient’s views . . . .”).
300
Id. at 1009.
301
Id. at 1009-10.
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“extraordinary power” in these circumstances,302 and “the basic policy
underlying the nondelegable acts doctrine is that some decisions
should be made personally—or not made at all.”303 Even in the wake of
the creation of the durable power of attorney, agency scholars and
lawyers questioned whether health care decisions were of the sort
that simply should not be made at all if they could not be made by the
affected person himself.304
Today, the power of attorney has evolved such that it is clear it
may be used as a device to permit the appointment of an agent for
medical decision-making.305 Despite the intimate nature of the choices
made by the agent in the face of the principal’s incapacity, the right to
make such choices is now widely recognized as falling within agency
authority.306 The history of the durable power of attorney itself helped
states reach that conclusion. It is evident from writings of the
committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws—the committee charged with drafting a model durable
power of attorney law—that the purpose of its creation was to provide
incompetents with “assistance in caring for their property rights or

302

Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1010.
304
Id. at 1009.
305
Twenty-nine states and the District of Columbia have statutes specifically
authorizing health-care powers of attorney while six others allow medical decisionmaking authority under a general durable power of attorney. ALASKA STAT. § 13.52.010
(2005); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2430-2444 (West 1993 & Supp. 2010); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15-14-501 to -502 (West 2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 81-43 (West 2004 & Supp.
2008); D.C. CODE §§ 21-2201 to -2213 (2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 709.08 (West 2007); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 31-36-1 to -13 (West 2003 & Supp. 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-4501 to
-4509 (2007); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 110½, §§ 804-1 to -12 (West 2002); IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 30-5-1 to -10 (West 1994 & Supp. 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144B.1-.12 (West
2008); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-625 to -632 (2009); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.970-.986
(West 2006); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2997 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, § 5-501
(1998 & Supp. 2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 201D, §§ 1-17 (West 1998 & Supp.
2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 700.496 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008); MISS. CODE ANN.
§§ 41-41-151 to -183 (West 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. §§ 404.700-.735 (West 2001 & Supp.
2008); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 449.800-.860 (West 2000); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137J:1 to -J:16 (LexisNexis 2005 & Supp. 2008); 1991 N.J. Laws 1367; N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 45-5-501 to -502 (West 2003 & Supp. 2008); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2980-2994
(McKinney 2007 & Supp. 2010); 1991 N.D. Laws ch. 266 (H.B. 1384); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. §§ 1337.11-.17 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 127.505-.585
(West 2009); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 5601-5607 (West 2005 & Supp. 2008); R.I.
GEN. LAWS §§ 23-4.10-1 to -2 (2010); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 44-66-10 to -80 (2002 & Supp.
2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 34-12C-1 to -8 (2004 & Supp. 2008); TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 34-6-201 to -214 (West 2007); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 44590h-1 (West 2006);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (West 2004 & Supp. 2008); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
14, § 3451 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 37.1-134.4 (West 2005); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 11.94.010-.900 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-30A-1 to -20
(West 2008); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 155.01-.80 (West 2006 & Supp. 2008); WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 33-5-201 (2007).
306
See supra text accompanying note 255.
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personal affairs, or for protecting their property or personal rights.”307
Slowly, the view has come to predominate that the drafters of durablepower-of-attorney statutes must have contemplated the making of
health care decisions as precisely one of those acts for which authority
could be, and most often would be, conveyed to an agent.308
There is no doubt that the decisions made by an agent under
a durable power of attorney, at least with regard to the health care of
the principal, are complex and personal. The agent needs to “assess
risks and costs, speak to friends and relatives . . . , consider a variety
of therapeutic options, seek the opinions of other physicians, evaluate
the . . . condition and prospects for recovery”—in short, make exactly
the kind of tough choices the principal himself would be required to
make absent the power of attorney.309 Still, the law has come to
recognize the principal’s right to select a proxy to speak for him in
making life and death decisions. Where the charge placed upon the
agent would be much less severe—merely carrying out a form
requirement rather than making critical decisions—the same
possibilities should be extended to principals seeking to perfect
ceremonial marriage requirements by proxy.
III.

THE EVOLVING CASE FOR PROXY MARRIAGE310

A.

Equitable Necessity in the Twenty-First Century

The legality of proxy marriage certainly seems to be nothing
more than an academic inquiry. After all, marrying with the use of
representatives is exceptionally unromantic.311 And in an age in which
marriage is viewed almost exclusively as the outcome of romantic
love,312 one might assume that so few couples would choose to marry
by proxy that its legality would be almost irrelevant. In fact, precisely
the opposite is true. Contemporary demand for proxy marriage is
startlingly strong, brought about in large part by the many
advantages afforded to married persons that their unmarried
counterparts do not share.

307

Fowler, supra note 207, at 1016 (citing MODEL SPECIAL POWER OF
ATTORNEY FOR SMALL PROPERTY INTERESTS ACT (1964), reprinted in NAT’L CONF. OF
COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL
CONFERENCE MEETING 273 (1964) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]).
308
See HANDBOOK, supra note 307, at 275.
309
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1001.
310
The inspiration for this title was drawn from Marvin Moore’s 1962 piece
entitled The Case for Proxy Marriage, cited supra note 16.
311
See Jennifer H. Svan, Married in Montana: Servicemembers Take
Advantage of State’s Double-Proxy Law, STARS & STRIPES (May 26, 2009),
http://www.stripes.com/articleprint.asp?section=104&article=62928.
312
See COTT, supra note 20, at 150.
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1. The Groups That Stand to Benefit from Proxy Marriage
In Montana, the only American state to allow marriages by
double proxy,313 county officials were so overwhelmed with proxymarriage applications—nearly thirty per month in Flathead County
alone—that they changed state law in 2007 to restrict proxy marriage
to situations in which one spouse is either a Montana resident or a
member of the armed forces.314 County clerks complained that they
simply could not otherwise handle the sheer volume of proxymarriage requests.315 The change may not have brought about its
intended effect. Three years later, even with a very narrow proxymarriage rule, Montana officials in Flathead County report that they
process as many as eighty double proxy marriages each month.316
Demand for proxy marriage among American citizens is
strong, brought about, in large part, by the sheer number of armed
forces stationed away from home. That number approached 300,000
in 2008.317 While at first blush that figure seems to pale in comparison
to the four million men that served in the armed forces during World
War I,318 the lengthy duration of America’s continued occupation of
Afghanistan and Iraq means that the number of troops who have
served abroad in the last decade is approaching the number serving
during the period when proxy marriage was viewed as a necessity.319
Of course, military personnel are not the only group for whom
proxy marriage might be an attractive option. Any couple separated
by a substantial distance might find the doctrine useful. In fact, the
history of Montana’s proxy-marriage law demonstrates that it grew
not out of a demand among members of the armed forces, but rather
from an influx of miners to the Montana area in the 1860s; they
typically came from out of state and desired to wed their “far-flung
fiancées.”320 Today, and particularly in the current troubled economy,
far more Americans are forced to seek employment and remain far
from home or their significant others for a lengthy period.321
Thousands of American citizens find themselves in such a situation,
313

MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-301 (2009).
Maurice Possley, Marriage by Proxy Booming in Montana, MONT. LAW.,
June/July 2007, at 32.
315
Id.
316
Svan, supra note 311 (“Flathead County district court processes from six to
20 double proxy marriage licenses per week . . . .”).
317
U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., ACTIVE DUTY MILITARY PERSONNEL STRENGTHS BY
REGIONAL AREA AND BY COUNTRY (2008), available at http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/
personnel/MILITARY/history/hst0803.pdf.
318
See Gordon, supra note 91, at 32.
319
Rod Powers, The Cost of War, ABOUT.COM (Jun. 19, 2010), http://usmilitary.
about.com/od/terrorism/a/iraqdeath1000.htm (describing the duration of United States’
military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq).
320
Svan, supra note 311.
321
See Broadway, supra note 22, at 112-14; Government Jobs Overview, supra
note 24. See generally Briffault, supra note 21.
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and while the number of those persons desiring to perfect a proxy
marriage is certainly just a small fraction of those who work away
from home, modern employment conditions, namely, increasing longdistance employment over the last century, have no doubt
significantly bolstered demand for proxy marriage.322
Finally, the number of same-sex individuals in committed
relationships, who often desire the rights and responsibilities of
marriage, and who might take advantage of proxy rules in a state
allowing same-sex marriage, has also increased dramatically since
proxy marriage was born in this country.323 In the 1920s and 1930s,
gay and lesbian culture was just beginning to take hold in the United
States.324 Today, there are reportedly 710,000 acknowledged
homosexual Americans,325 and the 2010 census figures are expected to
report a substantial increase in the number of those persons involved
in committed relationships.326 Because gay and lesbian couples can
legally marry in only a few American jurisdictions, their sole option
for perfecting a valid marriage is to endure the hardship of traveling
to a jurisdiction that recognizes same-sex marriage and does not
restrict its application to residents.327
Constituents of all of the above-described groups are likely to
desire to marry by proxy at levels not yet seen before, stemming from
the fact that they cannot perfect a ceremonial marriage. The
availability of the proxy-marriage option would confer a panoply of
advantages that no other legal status can bring, both to the spouses
themselves and to their children.328
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Jennifer Levitz, Unemployed Hit the Road to Find Jobs, WSJ.COM (June
25, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124587593994649417.html.
323
The 1990 census in Minnesota counted gay couples for the first time and,
by 2000, nearly 10,000 gay couples statewide were living in Minnesota; many already
considered themselves to be married simply by cohabitation. By 2007, that number had
increased to 13,000. Jason Hoppin, Same-Sex Couples Glad to be Counted in U.S.
Census, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Minn.), Mar. 15, 2010, at A1. See Lavery, supra note
27 (describing how “e-marriage” may be beneficial to same-sex couples); see also
Candeub & Kuykendall, supra note 27.
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MARY BETH NORTON ET AL., A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES: SINCE 1865, at 641 (2009).
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2000 Census Information on Gay and Lesbian Couples, GAY DEMOGRAPHICS,
http://www.gaydemographics.org/USA/USA.htm (last visited Feb. 15, 2010).
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Hoppin, supra note 323.
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Even this strategy may prove ineffective in giving gay and lesbian couples the
legal advantages they desire. The federal Defense of Marriage Act allows states to refuse
recognition of a same-sex marriage valid in the place of perfection. Mary L. Bonauto, DOMA
Damages Same Sex Families and Their Children, 32 FAM. ADVOC. 10, 11-12 (2010). Thus,
upon returning to a home state that does not permit same-sex marriage, the couples
described would not have gained much in the way of legal advantage.
328
See NAT’L MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS: THE SOCIAL
HEALTH OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 22 (July 2007).
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2. The Benefits of Proxy Marriage
Perhaps foremost among the rights a party might seek
through a proxy marriage are immigration benefits. A controversial
English case that recently made headlines provides an instructive
example. Two English residents, a Polish citizen and a Brazilian
citizen, were married by double proxy in Brazil while they remained
in London.329 The marriage made the Brazilian husband the spouse of
a European Union citizen, thus granting him the right to remain in
England permanently.330 British immigration officials acknowledged
the validity of the couple’s proxy marriage in Brazil but argued that
the couple had used proxy marriage to circumvent English
immigration policy,331 which would have denied immigration effects to
a marriage perfected in England because the intended husband was
in the country on only a temporary visa.332 Immigration officials
essentially bemoaned the spouses taking advantage of what they
described as a “loophole” in immigration policy by engaging in a proxy
marriage.333 When the husband was denied United Kingdom resident
status, he sued, arguing that a refusal to grant him residency violated
his human rights.334 A lower court immigration judge agreed, and the
House of Lords ended the controversy in late 2008 when it ruled that
further investigating the motives of the couple’s Brazilian proxy
marriage would be a breach of their human rights.335 The parties to
this proxy marriage insisted that their marriage is “genuine” and “not
a sham,” and that they strongly desired to marry but simply could not
bear the cost and complication of traveling to Poland or Brazil to do
so.336 Proxy marriage was their only option—and an option that
conferred substantial immigration advantages on the husband.
In a high-profile case closer to home, an American resident
claimed permanent resident status based on a proxy marriage to a
deceased Marine.337 Hotaru Ferschke, a Japanese citizen, married an
American serviceman by proxy in Japan after he deployed for service
329

See Dan Newling, The Wedding with No Bride and No Groom as Brazilian
Marries Pole “By Proxy” to Stay in Britain, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 12, 2008),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1094306/The-wedding-bride-groom-Pole-Brazilianmarry-proxy-stay-Britain.html.
330
Id.
331
Id.
332
Visitors of the UK are not permitted to apply for a visa on the basis of
marriage if not a European citizen, not married to a person present, and not settled in the
UK. See Fiancé/e of an UK Citizen, Permanent Resident or EU Citizen,
WORKPERMIT.COM, http://www.workpermit.com/uk/fiance.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
333
Newling, supra note 329.
334
Id.
335
Id.
336
Id.
337
See Kristin M. Hall, Proxy Wedding Means Marine’s Widow, Baby
Unwelcome, KNOXNEWS.COM (Sept. 17, 2009), http://www.knoxnews.com/news/2009/
sep/17/proxy-wedding-means-marines-widow-baby-unwelcome.
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in Iraq and she learned she was pregnant with his child.338 One month
after the proxy marriage, Ferschke’s husband was killed during a
house raid in Iraq.339 Ferschke sought to obtain permanent residency
in the United States for herself and her son, as the spouse and child
of an American citizen.340 The federal government denied her request
because the parties’ marriage was perfected by proxy.341 And while the
United States government recognizes, for immigration purposes,
proxy marriages valid in the jurisdiction in which they were
contracted, it imposes the additional requirement of consummation
before a proxy marriage can confer immigration status.342 Because
Ferschke and her husband did not live together or engage in sexual
activity after their marriage, she was denied permanent residency.343
Immigration officials have expressed distress over the case, noting
the sacrifices of Ferschke’s family for this country, but believe the law
allows no other outcome.344 Ferschke sought the help of three United
States congressmen, who introduced a private bill to aid her.345 That
bill passed in the House on November 15, 2010, but it is unknown
when or if the Senate will act.346 Ferschke’s status remains
unresolved.347 She returned to Japan in January 2010.348
It is obvious from the Ferschke story that not all attempts to
use proxy marriage to obtain immigration advantages are successful.
Still, the two stories together demonstrate the potential advantages
of a proxy marriage to better the immigration status of foreign
residents, often in deserving cases.
In addition to immigration status, marriage confers a
staggering array of property rights upon the parties to it. The right to
succeed from a deceased spouse who leaves no will,349 the right to an

338

Id.
Id.; see also Charlie Reed & Chiyomi Sumida, Immigration Law Aimed at
Troops’ Foreign Spouses Passes House, STARS & STRIPES (Nov. 17, 2010), http://www.
stripes.com/news/pacific/immigration-law-aimed-at-troops-foreign-spouses-passes-house1.125703.
340
Hall, supra note 337.
341
Id.
342
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(35) (2006); see also SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S.
STICKNEY, NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW & FAMILY § 4:13 (2009). Some
states, even outside the immigration context, require consummation of a marriage on
penalty of nullity. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-1 (2010).
343
Hall, supra note 337.
344
Id.
345
Robert Norris, Marine Widow Ferschke and Son, ‘Mikey,’ Return to Japan,
THEDAILYTIMES.COM (Jan. 6, 2010), http://www.thedailytimes.com/article/20100106/
NEWS/301069985.
346
See Marine Sergeant Michael H. Ferschke, Jr. Memorial Act, H.R. 3697,
111th Cong. (2010), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h111-6397.
347
See id.; see also Reed & Sumida, supra note 339.
348
Norris, supra note 345.
349
See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102 (amended 2008).
339
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elective share when a spouse dies with a will,350 life insurance
benefits, pension payments, health insurance coverage, and a whole
host of other entitlements are given to spouses alone.351 In the
military context, there are a number of more particular advantages
provided to spouses of active-duty servicemembers, particularly when
they are killed in combat.352 For instance, the United States
government pays a “death gratuity” of $100,000 to the surviving
spouse of a member of the armed forces who dies on active duty.353
Both inside and outside the military context, then, marriage provides
substantial property entitlements to its parties. And when they are
unable to undergo a ceremonial marriage because of impossibility or
exceptional inconvenience, proxy marriage is the only means of
conferring the advantages of marriage that both parties so desire.
Finally, children may have much at stake in the recognition of
their parents’ proxy marriage. While children born both inside and
outside of marriage are now generally recognized, on constitutional
grounds, to have the same rights and duties vis-à-vis their parents,354
the ease with which they may assert these rights still differs based on
their parents’ marital status.355 Children born during the marriage of
their parents, or within a reasonable period after the dissolution of
their parents’ marriage, enjoy a legal presumption of filiation.356 The
child born to a married American servicemember on duty overseas,
for instance, would not have to suffer the expense and inconvenience
of proving paternity before receiving legal recognition as the
350

See id. § 2-202.
Spouses of military servicemembers, for example, are entitled to the
following benefits: Death Gratuity (a one-time non-taxable payment to help surviving
family members deal with the financial hardships that accompany the loss of a
servicemember); Veteran’s Death Pension (pension for surviving spouses of deceased
veterans); Dependency and Indemnity Compensation (a monthly benefit paid to eligible
survivors of certain deceased veterans); Survivors’ and Dependents’ Education
Assistance Program (provides education and training opportunities to eligible
dependents of certain veterans; offers up to forty-five months of education benefits;
benefits may be used for degree and certificate programs, apprenticeship, and on-thejob training); Gold Star Lapel Button (widows and widowers entitled to Gold Star Lapel
Button); Survivor Health and Dental Benefits (surviving spouses can continue to
receive health and dental benefits); TRICARE Eligibility (a health benefit program).
See Understanding Survivor Benefits, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits/
survivor-benefits (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
352
See id.
353
See Death Gratuity, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military.com/benefits/
survivor-benefits/death-gratuity (last visited Oct. 3, 2010).
354
See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977) (holding that a provision of the
Illinois Probate Act which allowed children born outside of marriage to inherit by
intestate succession from their mothers only, although children born of a marriage may
inherit by intestate succession from both parents, denies equal protection to children
born outside of marriage).
355
But see Tricare Eligibility, MILITARY.COM, http://www.military/com/
benefits/tricare/tricare-elibility (some military health insurance benefits may be
available to children born outside of marriage) (last visited Oct. 2, 2010).
356
See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 185 (2009).
351
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servicemember’s descendant. The law would presume him the
servicemember’s son and treat him as such unless a party with a
contrary interest proved otherwise.357 But the protections of a filiative
presumption depend upon marriage of the child’s parents. And again,
when parents are unable to perfect a ceremonial marriage, a proxy
marriage may be the only means of creating presumptions that aid
children in establishing the parent-child relationship.
In short, the need for a narrow doctrine legalizing proxy
marriage is great, brought about by a more geographically diverse
society. Law- and policymakers must recognize that a changing
culture demands a new look at whether rules that exclude the use of
agents in the marriage ceremony continue to effect equity in the
twenty-first century.
B.

The Protective Mechanisms of the Power of Attorney

Perhaps one of the most significant obstacles that has
prevented American courts and legislatures from widely recognizing
the validity of proxy marriages all these years is nothing more than
fear. Fear of the limitations of agency to effect justice in an intimate
context is palpable. As one scholar has noted, “there is always the
possibility that an agent will make an irrational decision that
needlessly” harms the principal.358 Fear of the application of agency
principles to the marriage contract should not overshadow the
potential for equitable gains, however. General agency law includes a
multitude of mechanisms designed to protect both principals and
agents, which are particularly helpful when analyzed in the marital
context.359 Moreover, the basic principles of agency can be slightly
tailored with little difficulty where necessary to better fit the
marriage contract. Essentially, by divesting the proxy of nearly all
discretion and requiring exceptional specificity in a writing creating
the agency relationship, a regime can be created that permits proxy
marriage but, at the same time, allays the fears that have posed
hurdles to its recognition for so many years.
1. The Straightjacket of Form
As a general matter, agency relationships need not be created
in writing.360 The principal-agent relationship, which is a contractual
one, may come about by mere oral agreement or perhaps even
tacitly.361 Nonetheless, the law has long recognized the need for more
solemnity in the creation of an agency relationship for certain
357
358
359
360
361

Id.
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1005.
See infra Parts III.B.1-4.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b (2006).
See id. § 3.01.
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significant transactions.362 The common law equal-dignity rule
appropriately regulates the form necessary for a document creating
an agency relationship by requiring the power of attorney to be in
writing if a writing is required for the underlying transaction for
which the agent is given authority to act.363 Therefore, a power of
attorney to alienate property on behalf of the principal or bind the
principal as a surety must be in writing and must expressly confer
authority to undertake specific action rather than generally grant the
agent responsibility for handling all the affairs of the principal.364
Some states have gone beyond the pure common law formulation of
the equal-dignity rule to require that the agency contract not only be
in writing, but also in whatever particular form is required of the
underlying transaction.365 Still others require particular types of
agency contracts to assume the law’s highest form requirements; the
durable power of attorney, for instance, frequently must be executed
before a notary and two witnesses.366
In the marriage context, application of the most restrictive
equal-dignity rule would lead to absurd results. Requiring a power of
attorney for a proxy marriage to be perfected before a qualified
officiant, typically a religious official or judicial officer,367 for instance,
makes little sense. The law has recognized as much in the corporate
context or “when an agent acts only as an amanuensis who signs at
the principal’s request,” where the equal-dignity doctrine has been set
aside as illogical.368

362

The power of attorney is the “written instrument by which one person . . .
confirms the authority of another . . . to perform specified actions on [his] behalf.”
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1013-14. It is not a prerequisite to the creation of an agency
relationship, but it “serves as an objective manifestation to third parties that such an
agency has been created.” Id. at 1014.
363
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b (2006); see also Wendell H.
Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate & Agency: A Kommentar
on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1122 (1999).
364
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. b.
365
Holmes & Symeonides, supra note 363, at 1122.
366
RICHARD C. MILSTEIN, THE FLORIDA BAR, FLORIDA WILLS (FOR MODEST
ESTATES), POWERS OF ATTORNEY, AND HEALTH CARE ADVANCE DIRECTIVES 84 (2007).
367
See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:202 (2008) (“A marriage ceremony may be
performed by (1) A priest, minister, rabbi, clerk of the Religious Society of Friends, or
any clergyman of any religious sect, who is authorized by the authorities of his religion
to perform marriages, and who is registered to perform marriages; (2) A state judge or
justice of the peace.”).
368
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.02 cmt. c. For example, corporate
officers are agents who enter into transactions on behalf of the corporation. However,
corporate officers typically are granted authority to act on the corporation’s behalf in
the articles of incorporation, by-laws, or a board resolution. It would thus be illogical
and cumbersome to apply the equal-dignity doctrine and require an individual writing
granting authority for nearly every act undertaken by the agent. See id.
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Still, the evidentiary and cautionary functions of ceremonial
marriage requirements369 could be served by requiring that a power of
attorney to marry be executed in writing, at a minimum. Requiring
even more—the presence of a notary or witnesses—would also be
consistent with agency principles in the intimate area of the durable
power of attorney370 and would be a reasonable demand to make of
those desiring to perfect a proxy marriage.371
2. Specificity and Duration Limitations
Form requirements aside, a number of foreign jurisdictions
that sanction proxy marriage have imposed additional mandates on a
power of attorney to marry that the United States could borrow in a
manner consistent with American agency principles. Most Central
and South American countries, for example, require that the “other
party to the marriage . . . be clearly and unmistakably designated by
name in the document appointing the proxy [and] that the marriage
can be concluded with this person only and with nobody else.”372 Other
jurisdictions require a specification of the “place, day, and hour
designated for the celebration of the marriage.”373 Some countries even
369

See John H. Wade, Void and De Facto Marriages, 9 SYDNEY L. REV. 356,
360 (1981) (“Courts dealing with property disputes had for centuries before 1753
suggested that a ceremonial marriage was far easier to prove in court than merely a de
facto one. Thus then, as today, formalized marriages were especially desirable for
evidentiary reasons. But ethics certainly played at least a subsidiary role in the
emergence of the legal requirement of ceremony. For public ceremony hopefully gave
time for reflection about the serious nature of marriage, perhaps delayed impulsive
passion, scared off fortune hunters in search of heiresses, and allowed time for social
approval and advice.”). But see D.E. Engdahl, Medieval Metaphysics and English
Marriage Law, 8 J. FAM. L. 381, 382 (1968) (arguing that validity requirements in
marriage laws are often barriers to justice).
370
See MILSTEIN, supra note 366, at 84.
371
Mexican law currently requires that a grant of agency authority to marry
be made before a notary and two witnesses. CÓDIGO CIVIL FEDERAL art. 44 (Mex.),
translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO, supra note 192, at 17.
372
Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368. But see id. (describing Islamic law, wherein
the proxy is given authority even to choose the bride for the principal).
373
See CÓDIGO DE LA FAMILIA art. 47 (Pan.), translated in CIVIL CODE OF
PANAMA, supra note 189, at 294-95 (“Marriage can be contracted by the appearance
before the official and two witnesses, without legal impediment, by one of the parties
and the person to whom the other party has awarded a special power of attorney, by
notarial act; provided that the person that is domiciled or is a resident at the place of
officiating of the official that is to celebrate the marriage is always necessary. The
power of attorney must express the name of the person with whom the marriage is to
be performed, and basic informational facts for identifying the person, and the
marriage shall be valid unless the revocation of the power of attorney has been given to
the empowered agent, in due form, prior to the celebration of the marriage.”); CÓDIGO
CIVIL FEDERAL art. 102 (Mex.), translated in FEDERAL CIVIL CODE OF MEXICO, supra
note 192, at 17 (“The parties or their specially empowered agents, constituted in the
manner provided in Article 44, as well as two witnesses to each of the parties that
verify their identity, must be present before the Civil Registry judge at the place, day
and hour designated for the celebration of the marriage . . . .”).
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limit the maximum duration of a power of attorney to marry to a
relatively short period.374 In Italy, for instance, a proxy marriage must
be celebrated within 180 days of the grant of agency authority.375 Such
specificity and duration restrictions would allow American courts to
recognize the equitable need for proxy marriage while, at the same
time, limiting the breadth of the authority granted to the agent.
3. The Possibility of Revocation
Principles of revocation, which may arise in any agency
contract, can also play a role in protecting principals to proxy
marriages. An agency contract is typically revocable at the will of the
principal,376 and this general rule should apply in the marital context
as well. Indeed, scholars have long observed that the revocable nature
of the power of attorney is a consideration that strongly militates
against legally recognizing proxy marriage.377 The worry is that the
ability of the principal to revoke his proxy’s authority at any time
may result in marriages that do not meet with the principal’s
changed desires.378
Agency law is already well equipped to deal with the familiar
problem of revocation, however. Because a revocation may have
substantial effects on third parties, it is not effective in withdrawing
the agent’s authority until the agent receives notice of the
revocation.379 The burden placed upon the principal is slight; he must
simply communicate his change of heart to the agent before the hour
he designated for his act arrives.380 In the marital context, the
application of this general rule adequately protects the principal, who
would be bound only to marriages to which he specifically consented
and that were contracted before he gave his duly appointed agent
notice of his changed intent.

This form of regulation is not wholly unknown to American law, as agency
theorists have long distinguished between “general agents” and “special agents,” the
latter being authorized to conduct only a single transaction on the principal’s behalf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 2.01 cmt. d.
374
See supra note 182.
375
CODICE CIVILE art. 111 (It.); see also THE ITALIAN CIVIL CODE AND
COMPLEMENTARY LEGISLATION (Mario Beltramo, Giovanni E. Longo & John H.
Merryman trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (1991).
376
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.06.
377
See Apt (otherwise Magnus) v. Apt, [1947] P.D. 127 (Eng.), available at
1947 WL 10609; Recent Cases, 10 B.U. L. REV. 378, 403 (1930).
378
52 AM. JUR. 2D Marriage § 15 (2009).
379
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 3.10.
380
Spain’s proxy marriage legislation provides a contemporary example of the
application of agency revocation principles in the marital context. CÓDIGO CIVIL art. 87
(Spain), translated in WALTON, supra note 199, at 141 (agency power “shall be valid if,
before [the marriage’s] celebration, the person so authorized should not have been
notified in an authentic form of the revocation of power”).
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4. The Discretionless Power of Attorney
The confines of American agency law are, in all of the ways
set out above, already well designed to serve the parties to a proxy
marriage. The specificity that could be required in the power of
attorney and the fact that all the agent really does is stand-in to meet
a form requirement means that the “proxy” in a proxy marriage is not
a proxy, or true agent, at all. Rather, “[t]he proxy is . . . nothing but a
messenger, a ‘porte-parole,’ ‘nuntius,’ ‘Bote.’ He has no authority
whatsoever to inject himself into the legal sphere of the party who
appointed him. The proxy’s own will does not enter into the picture.”381
The role of the proxy and the power of attorney’s protective
mechanisms provide comfort, then, in ensuring that entry into one of
the law’s most intimate relationships is made by will and intention of
the principal himself. And because the law already sanctions the
application of agency principles in other intimate areas—including
will-making, transferring child custody, and creating durable powers
of attorney—all of which give the agent substantially more decisionmaking authority than proxy marriage,382 the modest role of an agent
in a proxy marriage should be easily tolerated.
IV.

TOWARD A WEDDING WITH NO BRIDE AND NO GROOM383

Proxy marriage fails to conform well to today’s wedding fairy
tale. It requires none of the trappings that have come to be considered
traditional.384 At best, it is a wholly unromantic way to perfect the
contract of marriage. But it is a useful, even necessary, avenue to
marriage for many couples that want to undertake the lifetime of
rights and duties associated with marriage but are unable to fulfill
typical ceremonial marriage requirements.
Fear and consternation associated with a departure from
strict adherence to the requirements of traditional ceremonial
marriage is misplaced. By allowing common law marriage, the law in
many American jurisdictions has already gone rather far in creating
inroads to the requirement that a marriage be celebrated formally
with both spouses physically present in the same room at the same

381

Schwelb, supra note 37, at 368. “Porte-parole” is French for “spokesman,
mouthpiece.” J.E. MANSION, 2 HARRAP’S NEW STANDARD FRENCH AND ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 77 (R.P.L. Ledesert & Margaret Ledesert eds., 1973). “Nuntius” is Latin
for “messenger, bearer of news.” LEXICON OF THE LATIN LANGUAGE 578 (F.P. Leverett
ed., 1850). “Bote” is German for “messenger, courier, bearer.” GERMAN-ENGLISH
ENGLISH-GERMAN DICTIONARY 126 (Cassell’s rev. ed. 1978).
382
See supra Part II.
383
Inspiration for this title was drawn from Newling, supra note 329.
384
But see Dan Barry, Trading Vows in Montana, No Couple Required, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2008, at A11 (describing the “sugary vows written by the absentee
bride and groom” that two Montana proxies once delivered to each other).
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time.385 Allowing spouses to celebrate a marriage with the assistance
of agents is perhaps even less troubling, particularly considering that
the law already endorses the use of agents in other intimate
transactions, such as will-making, transferring child custody, and
even making end-of-life decisions. In fact, we often view agency law
as designed to do precisely what we fear in the marriage context,
namely, allow the principal to authorize an agent to act for him in a
significant, often personal, transaction.386
Creating symmetry in agency law by sanctioning proxy
marriage is simply the next logical step in the evolution of agency law
as applied to intimate relationships. It is a step that can be taken
confidently, given that the agent in a proxy marriage may be granted
far less discretion and decision-making responsibility than he is
afforded in other personal dealings, and given the strong foundation
of protection that American agency rules already affords principals
through form requirements, duration restrictions, and revocation
rules. In short, agency principles are ripe for application to the
contract of marriage, and the idea of a proxy marriage—a groomless,
perhaps even brideless, wedding—should be embraced.
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See supra note 9.
Fowler, supra note 207, at 1016 (describing the creation of a national
committee to study ways in which a power of attorney might aid individuals in
managing their most personal affairs).
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